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I. INTRODUCTION
Political thinkers have long worried that freedom might be selfundermining, tending to erode the liberal rights and democratic
politics that form its foundations.1 The argument has ancient and
modern versions, versions of the political left and of the right.2 No
1. Throughout this article, I use “liberal” to refer to a commitment to autonomyprotecting personal rights as a basic normative principle of political and legal order. I use
“democratic” to refer to a commitment both to majoritarian government through elections
and, more broadly, the idea that the collective self-government of political communities is a
basic normative principle of political and legal order.
2. Anxious liberals like John Stuart Mill and meliorist conservatives like Alexis de
Tocqueville worried that democracy threatened to swamp freedom under the “tyranny of the
majority” or “democratic despotism.” See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 690–95 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1850)
(describing a despotism of innumerable small forms of interference with personal liberty); id. at
246–61 (describing “the tyranny of the majority,” a more direct application of power by a
regnant majority over a vulnerable minority); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71–74
(Geraint Williams ed., Everyman 1993) (1859) (describing evolution of the idea of the tyranny
of the majority from the simple version of electoral domination to the more complex idea of
the subtle limitation on the freedom and judgment of each by the opinions as well as the
political power of all). These grim warnings carried very old political arguments into the
democratic era. Thinkers as eminent and diverse as Plato and the English monarchist Robert
Filmer (John Locke’s target in the Two Treatises on Government) have argued that a society
dedicated to personal freedom and collective self-government would degenerate into personal
self-indulgence and political mob rule. See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER
WRITINGS 2 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680) (identifying
the wish for self-government with original sin); id. at 28–29 (summarizing a long history of
attacks on the character of democracies as violent, unstable, and tending to elevate selfish and
sadistic leaders over nobler characters); 7 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240–43 (Allan Bloom ed. &
trans., 1991) (examining the argument that unbalanced devotion to personal freedom and
relativism among desires and opinions undermine liberty and self-government, so that “[t]oo
much freedom seems to change into nothing but too much slavery, both for private man and
city” and “tyranny is probably established out of no other regime than democracy . . . the
greatest and most savage slavery out of the extreme of freedom”). After the liberal and
democratic revolutions in France, the United States, and elsewhere, radicals on both the left
and the right took up the same arguments. Arch-reactionary Joseph de Maistre proclaimed that
the French Revolution’s defiance of established authority would bring anarchy and drown
Europe in seas of blood. For an introduction to de Maistre’s thought, see ISAIAH BERLIN, THE
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 91–174 (Henry
Hardy ed., 1990). See id. at 111, 117, and 163 for particularly vivid examples of de Maistre’s
worldview, in which human existence is soaked in blood and all violence and suffering are
punishment for the sin of an inherently debased human nature. The leftists of the Frankfort
School argued that the liberal doctrine of personal autonomy found its perfection in the cruel
nihilism of the Marquis de Sade and Friedrich Nietzsche. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR
W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 81–119 (John Cumming trans., Herder &
Herder 1972) (1947). The twentieth century produced a new genre of anxious liberal.
European fascism and post-colonial nationalism both suggested that free men and women
would flock to doctrines that made them unfree: promises of ethnic unity, moral clarity, and
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doubt the only adequate answer is the sum of the answers to many
particular questions: whether and when popular elections undermine
liberal rights, how free markets enhance or undermine democracy,
and so forth. In this article, I address an emerging problem in a
central area of contemporary freedom: reproductive autonomy. I ask
whether reproductive autonomy can undermine the political
conditions that sustain it: a political and legal culture committed to
individual rights and the stability of the political order across
generations. The possibility that reproductive freedom might be selfundermining arises from two demographic crises. In Europe and
Northeast Asia, fertility rates—the number of children the average
woman will bear in her lifetime—have fallen well below the level
needed to replace the existing population.3 Meanwhile, in the largest
and more important developing countries, India and China, young
men outnumber young women by scores of millions, and the gap
between the sexes is growing.4
Each trend is the aggregate result of hundreds of millions of
increasingly autonomous reproductive decisions. When I refer to
“reproductive autonomy,” I do not mean exclusively or even
primarily the legally protected access to abortion and/or
contraception that United States commentators tend to designate by
impeccable authority. One can find versions of this anxiety on left and right alike. See, e.g.,
FOUAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS 233 passim (1998) (describing the rise of
nationalism in post-colonial Arab politics as destructive of customs of tolerance and pluralism);
V.S. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIEVERS 261, 297–305 (1981) (describing the development of
a popular Islamic political identity in newly self-governing countries as pathological and
violent); ASHIS NANDY, THE ILLEGITIMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND
THE POLITICS OF SELF 89–90 (1994) (discussing the recapitulation of colonial violence and
submission in the politics of post-independence nationalism). The same question has reemerged in Iraq, where political chaos implies that no democratic center can hold, and across
the Arab world, where pessimists predict that democracy would mean the end of already scant
liberal rights and, in time, of elections as well. See, e.g., James Glanz, A Little Democracy or a
Genie Unbottled?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 4.1 (discussing the victory of the Islamist
party Hamas in Palestinian elections and asking whether political self-government is consistent
with either liberty or order in illiberal settings). For a major recent statement of this concern,
see FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD (2003) (arguing that transitions from non-democratic to democratic rule are
hazardous to liberal freedoms unless independent institutions have emerged to protect such
freedoms, including civil society, reliable laws and courts, and orderly economic structures).
3. See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 42. I discuss
this trend and present sources at infra Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 65, 131–32 (2004). I
discuss this trend and present sources at infra Part II.B.
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the term. I am deliberately referring to the whole suite of factors that
make women and families inclined and able to exercise self-conscious
agency in whether and when to bear children. In expanding the
term, I am not trying to make any normative point about the
desirability or adequacy of uses of the term that focuses on legal
protections (although I have liberal views about the rights of
contraception and abortion). I use the term analytically to describe
autonomy in the substantive sense of the measure of control women
and families can and do exercise over reproduction, as distinct from a
focus exclusively on what they are legally permitted to do.5 Fertility
rates are below replacement level where legal, economic, and social
equality between the sexes and increasingly individualistic values
induce people to choose careers and non-traditional intimate
relationships over childrearing, and legal contraception and abortion
enable them to enforce those choices.6 Asia’s sex disproportion
comes from parents’ growing technological power to select their
children’s sex through pre-natal testing and abortions of female
fetuses, a preference that arises from both cultural attitudes and
economic incentives.7
5. My discussions of freedom and autonomy throughout this article use a substantive
rather than a legally formal sense of these terms, not because I reject the formal version, but
because I find the substantive versions helpful in a productive engagement with the questions
that drive the article.
6. See, e.g., Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second
Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update,
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (SPECIAL COLLECTION 3), Apr. 17, 2004, at 62–75. I develop this
dimension of the argument throughout the article.
7. The knottiest part of my formulation is the characterization of sex-selective abortion
as an expression of autonomy in China, where reproductive decisions are taken under the
pressure of the state’s notorious population-control policies. For an introduction to the policy
backdrop of this problem, see SUSAN GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINCKLER, GOVERNING
CHINA’S POPULATION: FROM LENINIST TO NEOLIBERAL BIOPOLITICS 19–44 (2005)
(describing the interaction of demographics and political power in China); id. at 166–201
(presenting relevant policy developments under the present Hu government). It would have
been possible to avoid this problem by simply cordoning off China from my discussion. India,
Taiwan, and other Asian countries have sufficiently dramatic sex ratios that China is not an
analytically necessary part of the story. However, I have chosen to include it for several reasons.
First, it is in many respects, including differential cultural valuation of sons and daughters and
the respective economic incentives to bear boys and girls, the same story as in nonauthoritarian regimes. Second, the sense in which I am using “freedom” or “autonomy” is not
restricted to legal permission to act but includes the broader set of determinants of what one is,
in fact, able to do with oneself and one’s life, which human potential one is able to realize in
action. In this respect, the availability of the same sex-selection-enabling technologies in China,
as in India and elsewhere, is an increase in autonomy, and the effect of that increase under
relevant constraints is precisely what interests me. I draw this way of thinking about freedom
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Both trends may have serious consequences for political order.
Sub-replacement fertility threatens to cripple public pension systems
by burdening shrinking numbers of working adults with the support
of growing numbers of retirees.8 The one sure way to avoid this
result—liberalizing immigration laws to let foreign-born workers
replace never-born native workers—would be such a goad to
xenophobic and nationalist politics that most observers regard it as
politically impossible.9 Moreover, declining population historically
inspires reactionary politics, with particular hostility toward women’s
autonomy, in settings as diverse as Augustan Rome and eighteenthcentury France.10
The other trend—disproportionately male populations, which
implies large numbers of unmarried young men—is historically
associated with growth in armies, military adventurism, and
organized crime and social disorder. It is also allied with
authoritarian and illiberal politics.11 Unmarried young men are the
engines of nationalist and fundamentalist movements, which pose a
threat to liberal and democratic prospects in the places where sex
disproportion is most pronounced.12 In both cases, then, individual
autonomy has systemic consequences that threaten to undermine the
very features of political order that sustain autonomy.13
from the work of Amartya Sen, which I briefly discuss at infra Part VI. Third, while political
authoritarianism is a distinctive kind of evil—and I make no apologies for such a statement—it
is my argument that reproductive decisions are made under a variety of constraints, some
subtler than others, which interact with political freedom or repression in influencing the
consequences of reproductive choice for demographics. Thus, I am interested in all the
constraints that bear on reproductive decisions and on ways to overcome or mitigate them, not
just in the decisions people make under “optimally free” or even approximately free
circumstances.
8. See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3. I discuss this phenomenon
much more fully at infra Parts II.A and V.
9. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRANT ET AL., LOW FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGEING 135
(2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG206.pdf (“The sheer
numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and its
Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe.”).
I address this issue further at infra Part II.
10. See CAROL BLUM, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: POPULATION, REPRODUCTION, AND
POWER IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 1–4 (2002); TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND
ROMAN SOCIETY 111–21 (1992) (outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and
the legal response).
11. I present this argument in full at infra Part III.C.
12. See id.
13. Having laid out the general shape of my argument, I owe the reader a word on why
I say virtually nothing about the United States in an article aimed primarily at an American
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These troubling paradoxes suggest that a picture of freedom’s
prospects today requires an understanding of biopolitics. Biopolitics
comprises the relationship between individuals’ control over their
bodies and the power the political community may exercise over
them: both the demands it may make (that they bear children, that
they fight and die) and the prohibitions it may impose (no abortions,
no second children). For the last sixty years, biopolitics has mainly
concentrated on personal autonomy vis-à-vis state power, with signal
examples being (in the direction of greater autonomy) abortion
rights in the North Atlantic countries and reproductive freedom, and
(in the direction of greater state coercion) authoritarian population
control in China.14 The two trends that occasion this article differ in
that they concern what might be called micro-politics: relations of
relative power in spheres often regarded as peripheral to politics,
particularly the family, which redound to more traditionally political
problems. These trends are particularly ominous because they might
be interpreted as reasons to condemn reproductive autonomy, the
main focus of the last several decades of biopolitics in the West and,
indeed, in much of the world. Sub-replacement fertility may be
construed as evidence that the state should demand childbearing to
avoid falling population—and, as my historical instances show, has
been so construed in the past. Skewed sex ratios, similarly, may be
offered as proof that certain populations are “not ready” to make

legal audience. The United States displays none of the trends I discuss here in any neat form.
The country’s overall fertility rate is ever so slightly below the replacement rate, but the
population continues to expand because of rapid immigration that has been relatively
uneventful politically. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION 71 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS]. For the time being, that is, modestly more traditional family practices than
Europe’s, combined with a significantly greater openness to immigration, seem to have
enabled the United States to dodge the demographic bullet. American readers should
nonetheless be interested in the argument here for several reasons: the future of the United
States depends on the future of the rest of the world; neither our openness nor our relative
fertility is irreversible; and, more optimistically, something like the American openness to
immigration may be part of an optimistic medium-term to long-term scenario for thirdgeneration biopolitics. I resist simply prescribing that open attitude to relative xenophobic
societies in this article simply because long-distance exhortations to change basic attitudes tend
to fall on deaf or resentful ears. In the meantime, a comparative examination of fertility in the
United States and Europe would be extremely interesting but would bulk up this article well
beyond reasonable length.
14. I describe the development of biopolitics over the past several centuries in much
greater detail at infra Part IV.
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responsible reproductive choices and so should not enjoy
reproductive autonomy.
Against these anti-autonomy positions, I argue for an approach
to biopolitics that is committed to deepening and extending
women’s substantive freedom. This approach, which I outline in Part
V, is oriented to solutions that acknowledge and, where possible,
take advantage of new biopolitical realities. An approach committed
to women’s substantive freedom seeks to ensure that women enjoy
all dimensions of autonomy: literacy, workforce participation,
empowerment in household decision-making, and capacity to
reconcile childrearing and career. As I argue, these multiple
dimensions of freedom interact in complementary fashion to mitigate
troubling demographic trends and make reproductive freedom less
disruptive of social order and intergenerational continuity.
The two demographic crises demonstrate that the commitment
to autonomy makes broader demands on the social order than has
seemed clear before now. If my argument is right, that commitment
should imply further commitment to creating and sustaining
conditions in which reproductive autonomy is not self-undermining.
Evidence from both Europe and Asia suggests that one variable that
increases fertility rates in highly developed societies and improves the
sex ratio of children in less developed societies is “women’s
substantive freedom”: the set of choices available to women and the
range of capabilities they can exercise. In Europe particularly,
increases in substantive freedom come mainly through social policies
that enable women to reconcile commitment to careers with
commitment to childrearing.15 In developing countries, women’s
literacy and workforce participation are the aspects of substantive
freedom that bring improvements in sex ratios. More autonomy
rather than less is the best answer to the threat that autonomy may
undermine its own foundations.16
15. The formulation is not gender-neutral, but neither is the social reality.
16. This article extends the themes of two previous papers that deal with the relationship
between freedom and property. In the first, I drew on the capabilities-oriented welfare
economics of Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen, the reform proposals of political
economist Hernando de Soto, law professor Yochai Benkler, and economist Robert Shiller to
develop what I called a freedom-promoting approach to property reform. I argued that
property regimes should maximize freedom, defined as capabilities: the power to make good
one’s potential to act along all dimensions of human capacity. I filled out this prescription by
proposing to give priority to two types of capabilities: foundational capabilities on which many
others supervene, such as physical mobility; and meta-capabilities, such as literacy, which
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Part II describes in detail the two demographic crises I have
already sketched: the decline of fertility rates to well below
replacement level in Europe and some other developed nations, and
a disproportion in numbers of young women and men already
totaling as many as one hundred million in India and China alone. I
emphasize the practical social problems that these trends imply: the
first, a vastly increased ratio of retirees to productive workers; the
second, a large population of unmarried young men. Part III
discusses the potential political implications of these demographic
trends. In Part IV, I put the discussion in a historical frame,
providing a brief history of modern biopolitics, beginning with
Thomas Malthus and the eugenics movements of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries—exemplars of the long-held premise that
the state had a legitimate interest in reproductive decisions. I then
sketch the twentieth-century North Atlantic commitment to
biopolitical autonomy with its origins in the horrors of the Second
World War and pseudo-scientific racism, and in the rise of sex
equality.
I then turn to solutions. In Part V, I describe a model of
“biopolitical public policy,” which both addresses the crises of
biopolitics and seeks in its solutions to acknowledge and take
advantage of biopolitical reality in novel ways. Specifically, I suggest
that novel financial arrangements for international and
intergenerational burden-sharing can mitigate the consequences of
enable one to revise or expand one’s capabilities. In the second article, I enriched this account
by developing an analysis of property regimes as the architecture of social relations, setting the
terms on which people recruit one another to pursue ends ranging from survival and prosperity
to more subtle forms of flourishing such as intimate relationships. The aim of that argument
was to take seriously the fact that people’s capabilities are not monadic: what we can do
depends on our power to recruit others to our ends, and on our susceptibility to others’
recruitment of us. Thus, to understand how a property regime shapes capabilities, it is
necessary to appreciate the relationships of recruitment that it sets up, and so to think of
freedom in a relational manner. The major innovation of that article was the argument that
people display a double character in relations of recruitment. On the one hand, we are
resources for one another’s projects, the objects of their enlistment and deployment. On the
other hand, we are all bearers of our own purposes, wishes, and aims. Property regimes help to
define the boundary between the ways others may recruit us as resources and the ways they are
obliged to respect us as ends. The normative kernel of that article was that, to maximize
freedom, property regimes should maximize reciprocity in interpersonal recruitment so that in
enlisting one another to our aims, we must take account of others’ interests and commitments
and envisage our own goals relative to theirs. This article extends the picture of people as both
autonomous agents and resources for others’ ends by bringing in the perspective of the state
and the imperatives of politics.
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declining fertility and might greatly diminish them in combination
with other responses. Part VI moves into the “core biopolitics”
issues of reproduction and childrearing, arguing for the value of an
enhanced conception of autonomy in addressing today’s
demographic crises. Beginning with Europe, I present evidence
suggesting that policies that increase substantive freedom by
enabling women and families to reconcile commitment to work with
the desire to rear children can raise fertility rates toward, if not to,
the replacement level. Turning to India and China, I show that gains
in women’s substantive freedom appear to be the only change that
improves sex ratios. I also observe admittedly speculative, but
nonetheless intriguing, reasons to hope that women’s substantive
freedom might directly work against extremist politics. Part VII
concludes.
II. THE NEW BIOPOLITICS: TWO CRISES
A. Sub-replacement Fertility and Rising Dependency Ratios
For several decades in the last century, many believed that global
population trends pointed ineluctably upward and that the social and
ecological problems of overpopulation were among the most
significant facing the species.17 At the beginning of the new
millennium, the facts began to change rapidly. Global fertility, which
in 1950–55 stood at about 5 children per woman, has fallen to
2.65.18 In 2050 it is projected to be 2.05 children per woman,
slightly below the replacement rate of 2.1.19 According to the
Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, this trend would lead to a global population of 9.1
billion by 2050, at which time growth rates would have slowed
considerably and population would be close to leveling off.20
Estimates premised on a faster decline in fertility rates show

17. See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 15–17
(1990) (arguing that exponential growth in population has set the species on a sure path to
exhausting the planet’s resources); PAUL H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968)
(arguing the same).
18. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects:
The 2004 Revision, 79 POPULATION NEWSL., June 2005, at 3.
19. Id.
20. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at vi.
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population stabilizing before 2040 at under 8 billion and beginning
to decline by 2050.21
For present purposes, the most interesting question is not global
population but a pair of subsidiary trends: the geographic
distribution of fertility decline and the ratio of working adults to
dependents (children and the retired) in national populations. The
fertility rate in developed countries now stands at 1.56 children per
woman, significantly below the replacement rate.22 Moreover,
fertility levels in all the world’s forty-four developed countries
(except Albania) are below replacement rate, and those in fifteen
countries (mainly in Southern and Eastern Europe) have fallen below
1.3, a level “unprecedented in human history.”23 Even assuming
continuing immigration and a substantial rebound in fertility rates
(partly on the assumption that today’s low levels reflect a
generational decision to delay childbearing rather than reject it
outright), these figures will have such countries’ populations
declining in absolute terms between now and 2050: by more than
thirty million in Russia, over seven million in Italy, nearly four
million in Germany, almost sixteen million in Japan, and over three
million in South Korea.24 The projected decline for these countries
ranges from over 20 percent of today’s population in Russia,
through more than 10 percent for Italy, to around 5 percent in
Germany.25
Declining fertility may reflect the economic incentives of a
system that expects parents to absorb most of the cost of raising
children (in contrast to retirement, which is publicly subsidized).
According to one recent estimate, the cost of raising a middle-class
child in the United States is over a million dollars in the first

21. Id. at vii.
22. Id.
23. Id. at viii. South Korea lies at 1.23, Poland at 1.26, Spain at 1.27, Italy at 1.28,
Germany at 1.32, and Russia and Japan at 1.33. Id. at 67–70. By contrast, nine countries with
high fertility and immigration rates are expected to account for more than half the world’s
population increase before 2050. These include the political flashpoints of Pakistan, Nigeria,
Congo, and Ethiopia, as well as India and China. The concentration of population growth in
countries with unstable and potentially significant politics is itself an important and troubling
matter, although outside the scope of this Article.
24. Id. at 35–37.
25. I have provided these numbers in round terms because so much uncertainty is
absorbed into such estimates that rough magnitudes are more honest than an exaggerated
precision premised on speculation.
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seventeen years of life.26 More than 80 percent of that figure comes
from forgone parental wages on the assumption that one parent
gives up a $45,000 salary at the time of the child’s birth and remains
out of the labor market until the child reaches seventeen; the
opportunity cost in forgone wages rises to nearly $60,000 by the end
of the period.27 These figures may be somewhat bloated—after all,
two-career families are common—but they capture the outlines of a
massive expense.
Declining fertility also appears to reflect changes in values and
priorities. Movement from traditional reproductive and family roles
and toward new emphasis on career, self-expression, and the quality
of friendship and romantic relationships all encourage postponing or
skipping marriage and childbearing.28 A study of European values
and family structures reveals that those who have adopted the
individualist and counter-traditional values just enumerated are most
likely to be single or involved in childless cohabitation, while
traditionalists are most likely to have entered into childbearing
marriages.29 The same study finds that the timing of European
countries’ fertility declines below replacement level corresponds
roughly to the timing of this transformation in values.30 A simpler
statistical artifact of this change is a recent poll finding that, even
absent economic constraint, German women on average express a
wish for fewer than two children .31
The effect of declining fertility rates is that as cohorts age, the
proportion of older to younger people grows. Rising life expectancy
amplifies the effect, as relatively large older populations stick around
to keep younger and relatively smaller cohorts company. In Europe,
the number of people of pensionable age for every 100 people of
working age is projected to rise from 35 today to 75 in 2050, with
one-to-one ratios in Italy and Spain.32 By another estimate, those

26. See PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE: HOW FALLING BIRTHRATES
THREATEN WORLD PROSPERITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 73 (2004).
27. Id.
28. See Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, supra note 6, at 62–75.
29. Id. at 70–72.
30. Id. at 47–48.
31. See Old Europe, Demographic Change, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 49–50.
32. Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3.
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over 65 in Europe will be equivalent to 60 percent of the workingage population in 2050.33
The proximate result promises to be a very serious economic
drag on countries already heavily burdened by public debt and slow
economic growth. An aging population means an increase in
spending on pensions and health care; a smaller working population
must make a larger per capita contribution to support the retired and
the sick. The European Commission has estimated that such
payments may drive up public spending by five to eight percentage
points of GDP by 2040 in the fifteen member countries of the
European Union, crowding out spending on productive
investments.34 Declining numbers of workers and reduced capital for
investment mean, other things equal, a fall in economic growth. The
International Monetary Fund has estimated that Europe’s annual
growth rate will be a half percentage point lower in 2050 than
now—a number too speculative to be meaningful, but which
expresses the certainty that a shrinking working population putting
an increased share of income into transfer payments cannot be good
for growth.35 Taken together, diminished growth and the redirection
of wealth to dependent populations will also crowd out spending on
international influence, either via military power or through
development assistance to new members of an expanded Europe and
the world’s poorest countries. Summing up these prospects, the
French Institute for International Relations has recently predicted
that Europe faces “a slow but inexorable ‘exit from history.’”36
B. “Bare Branches” and Sex Asymmetry
In this sub-part, I treat the disproportion between men and
women in populations where parents increasingly select the sex of
their children.37 This problem is linked to declining fertility by a
33. Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2002,
at 20, 22.
34. Old Europe, supra note 31, at 49.
35. See id.
36. See Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3.
37. There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion
caused by each of a variety of factors. One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over
daughters, exercised at different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective
abortion, infanticide, and preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher
levels of childhood mortality in girls than in boys. For an outline of the debate over
proportions among these causes, see Chu Junhong, Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-
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common structure: systematic social consequences arise from
individual reproductive choices.

Selective Abortion in Rural China, 27 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 259 (2001) (observing
that many Western observers were skeptical that sex-determination technology was widely
available in China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion that post-natal sex
discrimination or infanticide caused the sex disparity). Today it is clear that China’s domestic
production capacity makes possible widespread sex-determination technology, and reported
levels of sex ratio at birth show such a dramatic disproportion that any post-natal addition to
the ratio must be regarded as additional, not supplanting. Another candidate is inaccurate
reporting: some suggest that births of girls are underreported, either because of low cultural
valuation of females or because, under China’s one-child policy, parents who wish to have a
son may conceal the birth of a daughter in an effort to avoid enforcement of the policy. For a
discussion of this question, see Dudley L. Poston & Karen S. Glover, Too Many Males:
Marriage Market Implications of Gender Imbalances in China 8–10 (unpublished paper, on file
with author). As Poston and Glover note, however, Taiwan’s sex disproportion at birth
approaches China’s despite near 100 percent reporting and no legal constraint on fertility,
making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of China’s sex ratio. See id. at 9.
Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal practices of prenatal sexdetermination and sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by, Junhong Chu’s study of one
village in which she had earned the trust of participants showed high levels of both practices.
See Chu, supra, at 270, 273 (reporting 39 percent use of ultrasound sex testing during first
pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67 percent use in additional
pregnancies; 29 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 38 percent of that
group reported at least one sex-selective abortion). A third candidate is, paradoxically,
improving health overall. Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because
female fetuses are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males.
Hence, other things equal, an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases
the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages and stillbirths), should increase the proportion of male
fetuses. Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj & Sreenivasan Subramanian, Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex
Ratio at Birth: Some Suggestive Evidence from India, 40 J. DEV STUD. NO. 5, 91 (June 1,
2004). Although attractive for its note of optimism (perhaps not all news of sex disproportion
is bad news!) and for its application of medical insight to social inquiry, this explanation cannot
go far. The world’s richest countries, where fetal wastage rates are presumably much lower
than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions registered in those
countries. Political economist Emily Oster has recently drawn attention for her argument that
high rates of hepatitis B contribute to sex disproportion by inducing higher rates of male births
and female births; but Oster admits that hepatitis B cannot account for increases in sex
disproportion over the last fifteen years, when infection rates have stabilized or fallen. Emily
Oster, Hepatitis B and the Case of the Missing Women 2–3 (March 2005),
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/grad_student/007.pdf. Oster makes no claim that
hepatitis B could account for more than a fraction of the phenomenon. Other researchers,
notably Amartya Sen, have sounded extremely cautious notes about her findings, which,
although interesting, are far from conclusive. See Eve Conant, What Carried the Girls Away,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 12, 2006, at 27 (quoting Sen’s skeptical assessment). On the existing
evidence, it is very difficult to get away from the conclusion that sex-selective abortions and
gender bias in childrearing play a large role in shaping existing sex ratios.

901

PURDY.PP2.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM

[2006

1. The growth of the bare branches
A disproportion of men to women in Asian populations—the
result of sex-selective caregiving, infanticide, and, increasingly,
abortion—came to widespread attention in 1990 when the
economist Amartya Sen (future Nobel laureate) reported his
calculation that, relative to the natural proportion of male to female
births, more than one hundred million women were “missing”
worldwide.38 The natural sex ratio produces a slightly higher number
of women than men in a population.39 By contrast, today’s actual sex
ratio in China shows 106.7 men for each 100 women, and India’s
107.2 men per 100 women.40 The gap between expected and actual
sex ratios translates to more than forty million “missing women” in
China’s population of roughly 1.2 billion and more than thirty-nine
million among India’s roughly 1 billion people.
Many interwoven factors account for parental sex selection in
India: the higher status attached to male children, the superior
earning potential of men over women (with its corollary, greater
capacity to support parents and other family members), and the cost
of providing a bride’s dowry.41 A nationwide study conducted in
1997 found that Indian parents on average describe a 2:1 ratio of
sons to daughters as the optimal mix—a preference plainly
incompatible with natural sex ratios.42 India’s southern states, which
enjoy higher literacy rates than the rest of the country, exhibit the
least distortion in their sex ratios.43 Kerala, with near-universal
literacy, many female-headed households, and a net out-migration of
males for work, is unique in having significantly more women than
men in its population; however, neighboring Tamil Nadu has a ratio
of just over 101 men per 100 women, and Karnataka, home to

38. See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Dec. 20, 1990, at 61–66. Subsequent studies have modestly reduced his estimates, chiefly
because he used sub-Saharan African births as a baseline, and the share of women among births
in that population is slightly higher than for other groups. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra
note 4, at 58–59.
39. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 59–61.
40. Id. at 62. Similar numbers prevail in Pakistan (108.6) and Afghanistan (106.5), with
slightly less dramatic figures in Bangladesh (103.8) and Taiwan (104.3). Id.
41. See id. at 65–80.
42. See id. at 73.
43. See id. at 92.

902

PURDY.PP2.DOC

889]

10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM

The New Biopolitics

Bangalore, has a ratio somewhat under 104:100.44 The national sex
ratio at birth ranged from 109.8 to 113.8:100 between 1987 and
1998.
Two factors that promote reproductive autonomy appear also to
have contributed to India’s present sex asymmetry. One is the
increased availability and decreased cost of prenatal sexdetermination testing and abortion. Between 1982 and 1987 alone,
the number of sex-determination clinics in Bombay rose from 10 to
248.45 Amniocentesis, which cost the equivalent of $88 to $117 in
the 1980s, now costs $12 to $30—a lot of money in a poor country,
but also a huge decrease in cost for the poor.46 Ads for sexdetermination testing suggest the cost is worthwhile: “Better [500
rupees] now than . . . [500,000 rupees] later,” they warn, adverting
to the potential cost of a daughter’s dowry.47
Although there is dispute in India over how much of the
country’s sex disproportion arises from abortion and how much from
neglect of female infants, the sex bias in abortion is manifest.48 A
Bombay study of one thousand abortions found 97 percent were of
females, a number that seems implausibly high.49 A study of a
hospital in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent
of mothers of newborn boys admitted—with reticence that may
suggest underreporting—had undergone pre-natal sex-selection; the
comparable figure was 2.1 percent for mothers of girls.50 The other
female fetuses presumably were not carried to term.
The second interaction between reproductive autonomy and sex
disproportion is that falling fertility rates, with their connection to
increasingly mobile, expressive, and individualist modes of life,
exacerbate sex disproportion.51 Fertility rates have fallen dramatically
in most of India, albeit from a high baseline.52 Monica das Gupta

44. Id.
45. Id. at 110.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. For a start on the dispute, see id. at 112–13.
49. Id. at 111.
50. Id. at 112.
51. For a discussion of this cultural dimension of declining fertility, see Surkyn &
Lesthaeghe, supra note 6.
52. India’s current fertility rate stands at 3.07 children per woman, down from 5.43 in
1970–75. United Nations demographers predict a decline below replacement level in 2030–

903

PURDY.PP2.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM

[2006

and P.N. Mari Bhat have found that falling fertility intensifies the
pressure for sex selection because the total number of children that
parents want falls faster than the number of sons they desire.53 In
consequence, carrying a female infant to term diminishes the chances
of reaching the desired number of sons more dramatically for a
family desiring a small number of children than for a family that
wants a larger number of children. Consequently, where both
economic interest and social esteem produce a strong preference for
male over female children (or, more precisely, a preference for a mix
of male and female children that falls well off the biological
distribution), the broadly liberalizing trends that produce falling
fertility rates also increase the likelihood of sex-selective abortion
and, other things equal, will increase sexual disproportion.
China is the source of the term “bare branches,” which refers to
“surplus men” who will never be able to marry in countries of
“missing women.” As noted, China’s male-female ratio is 106.7:100,
and its “missing women” total about forty million.54 The sex ratio
for the population overall understates the sex disproportion among
the young, because China’s disproportion has grown a great deal in
recent years.55 Official Chinese publications put the ratio for children
under age five at 118:100.56 The introduction of ultrasound
technology for prenatal sex identification in the 1980s seems to have
increased the sex disproportion; an official ban on prenatal sex
identification has had uncertain effects as yet.57 As in India, the
preference for sons is powered by esteem (sons are higher-status than
daughters and are guarantors of family continuity) and by economic
interest (men are chief wage-earners and, above all, providers for
their parents’ retirement).58 The government’s notorious one-child
policy restricts the number of births in which families may attempt to
35, but that is nearly pure speculation. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at
68.
53. See Monica Das Gupta & P.N. Mari Bhat, Fertility Decline and Increased
Manifestation of Sex Bias in India, 51 POPULATION STUD. 307, 307–15 (1997).
54. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 58–59.
55. See id. at 131–32.
56. Id. at 132.
57. See id. at 171–73.
58. See id. at 155. Hudson and den Boer quote anthropologist Sulamith Heins Potter as
describing living conditions for retirees without children who rely on government support as
“pitiable,” noting that “these old men and women live in decrepit buildings with little food
and must depend on the goodwill of neighbors to provide water and fuel.” Id.
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reach the desired number of sons.59 The Chinese setting is thus a
striking combination of traditional state coercion and technologically
enabled reproductive autonomy, and of authoritarian biopolitics and
the problems of new biopolitics.
2. The consequences of sex disproportion
The inevitable consequence of sex disproportion is that,
assuming the wish to marry is at least as frequent in men as in
women, there will be many reluctant bachelors. Hudson and den
Boer estimate conservatively that by 2020 China will be home to
between twenty-nine million and thirty-three million “surplus males”
between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four.60 Their estimates for
India range between twenty-eight million and thirty-two million
bare branches.61 Even in the conservative range, these numbers raise
the prospect of more than fifty million young men in the world’s
most populous countries who will be reluctantly unable to marry or
become fathers.
What is a large population of unmarried young men likely to
mean? There are several parts to the answer. First, unmarried men
are statistically likely to belong to the lowest socioeconomic classes,
to be underemployed or unemployed, and to be relatively transient
because of both their need to move for work and their lack of familybased community ties.62 Second, according to historical sociologists,
they tend to associate with other bachelors in loose societies of
laborers, transients, adventurers, or ne’er do wells.63 The subcultures
59. In practice, the policy has been unevenly enforced, and where it is enforced the
policy amounts in effect to a ban on second children in urban areas and on third children in
rural areas, with significant dispensations for China’s ethnic minorities. See id. at 152–54.
60. Id. at 186.
61. See id. at 124.
62. See id. at 188–90. Except for the absence of family-based community ties, these
characteristics present a serious ambiguity in the direction of causation: men are not born
bachelors but become such, and men with limited aptitude, family wealth, and social capital are
likely to fare poorly in the marriage market. Thus, while bachelorhood may exacerbate the
characteristics just sketched, it is plausible that the chief dynamic at work is that a surplus of
men means the least marriageable will be channeled into bachelorhood.
63. See id. at 190–92 (summarizing a large amount of historical material on the
characteristics of bachelor populations). For particularly significant sources, see DAVID T.
COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE FRONTIER
TO THE INNER CITY (1996); James F. Rooney, Societal Forces and the Unattached Male: An
Historical Review, in DISAFFILIATED MAN: ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SKID ROW,
VAGRANCY, AND OUTSIDERS (Howard M. Bahr ed., 1970).

905

PURDY.PP2.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM

[2006

that develop in these groups are prone to drug and alcohol abuse,
violence, norms of extreme sensitivity to insult, and risk-taking
behavior of all sorts.64 Third, unless they move into monastic or
other orders that provide social integration without marriage, bare
branches maintain a relatively alienated attitude toward settled
society and sometimes fall into an oppositional and opportunistically
predatory stance. Hudson and den Boer follow a number of
historical scholars in suggesting that “surplus males,” seeking outlets
for ambition and energy, populated Chinese and Indian bandit
troops, freelance Chinese armies that spurred disastrous rebellions,
and Portuguese rogue aristocrats who preyed on peasants and led
expansionary overseas adventures.65
These general claims appear to line up with present reality in
India and China. Amartya Sen has observed that inter-regional
contrasts in India reveal “a strong—and statistically very significant—
relation between the female-male ratio in the population and the
scarcity of violent crimes.”66 Although the precise figures are
debated, millions of Chinese are transient, semi-employed, semi-legal
laborers known collectively as the “floating population,” thought to
be seventy to eighty percent male and largely unmarried.67
In this Part, I have summarized two unsettling demographic
trends: declining fertility and increasingly unequal sex ratios. Both
have systemic and troubling consequences: respectively, rising
dependency rates and stresses on public pension systems, and
unmarriageable male populations lacking clear paths to settled and
productive adulthood. I now turn to the specifically political
consequences of these trends.

64. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 192–200 (summarizing material on
these populations). For significant sociobiological accounts of this pattern, see Allan Mazur &
Alan Booth, Testosterone and Dominance in Men, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 353 (1998); Allan
Mazur & Joel Michalek, Marriage, Divorce, and Male Testosterone, 77 SOC. FORCES 315
(1998); Christian G. Mesquida & Neil I. Wiener, Human Collective Aggression: A Behavioral
Ecology Perspective, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 247 (1996).
65. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 200–02, 207–27, and sources cited
therein.
66. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 200 (1999).
67. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 230–38 (noting the widespread
association of this population with crime and alcoholism).
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III. DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL THREAT
A. The Pattern of Pro-natalist Politics

Declining fertility, or the perception of declining fertility, is not
new, even if it has never been so widespread or dramatic as it is now.
In past episodes, an unsettling pattern has recurred. Pro-natalist
agitators have identified culture, values, or preferences—pick your
vocabulary—as the source of declining fertility and issued polemics
against them. Pro-natalist polemicists tend to favor a homogenous,
hierarchical, and “virtuous” version of national community. This
form of pro-natalist politics has consistently identified the moral
health of the political community with its fertility rate. It has
consequently picked out three principles as diseases on the body
politic: individualism, with its stress on personal satisfaction and
development over reproduction; pluralism, the acknowledgement of
valid forms of life that do not honor family and reproduction
foremost; and, above all, women’s equality.
I give two historical instances, one from Imperial Rome, the
other from eighteenth-century France. While historical analogies
cannot be said to “prove” anything about the probable results of
present trends, they do serve two purposes. First, they illustrate
vividly the texture of cultural events, such as reactionary pro-natalist
politics, that would otherwise be mere dry forecasts. Second, because
they arise from circumstances in some ways similar to ours, they
evoke recurrent tendencies that may reveal something about human
reactions to circumstances that recur too seldom and with too much
irreducible variety to serve as the basis for social-science
generalizations.68
I have selected two examples remote from each other and from
the present because they represent a recurrent ideological pattern in
pro-natalist politics. An actual or perceived decline in fertility draws

68. This observation squares with one that Jared Diamond has recently made about the
value of historical case studies in seeking to make tentative social-science generalizations. While
there are “too many potentially independent variables and far too few separate outcomes to
establish those variables’ importance statistically,” there are also “huge quantities of
information about the sequence of steps connecting initial conditions to outcomes.” In other
words, dense information about specific events can help inform scholars about recurrent
patterns of cultural response to ecological or, in this case, biological events. See JARED
DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 194 (2005).
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attention to values and practices that take people away from
reproduction: pluralism, individualism, luxury, effeminacy, and
women’s empowerment, all polemically portrayed as decadence. The
new visibility of non-reproductive ways of living raises the possibility
that repopulation from generation to generation is not automatic;
that fertility depends on a culture that honors reproduction and laws
that reward it. Two responses are typical. First, political actors assert
a state interest in reproductive choices. Reproduction is now styled a
political as well as a natural duty, and the citizen or subject is
sometimes portrayed as the property of the state, a part of its stock of
natural resources. Second comes an assault—polemical at the most
modest and sometimes legally coercive—on non-reproductive
cultural forms: luxury, individualism, and any sexual practice that
does not produce offspring. This way of asserting the priority of state
or social interests over individual choice in intimate matters gives
pro-natalist politics an affinity with modern forms of authoritarian
and totalitarian politics, particularly the fascist apotheosis of the
nation.
In Rome during the age of the emperor Augustus, a widespread
perception arose that the Roman elite were failing to reproduce. In
this polemical view, elites preferred sensual indulgence to
childbearing and pursued that preference through refusal to marry,
contraception, abortion, exposure (abandonment) of newborns, and
infanticide.69 Augustus responded with a decree directing each
citizen to produce at least three children and granting certain
benefits to those who met this standard while punishing the
unmarried and the childless with penalties such as restrictions on
their right to inherit.70 This state claim on the reproductive capacity
of the citizenry was accompanied by a genre of declensionist
polemics, complaining that the once virile and fecund Roman people
had become effeminate, self-indulgent, and infertile.71 The attack was
69. See TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND ROMAN SOCIETY 111–21, 126–27 (1992)
(outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and the legal response).
70. Id. at 115–16 (noting that many ambiguities surround this decree, prominently
whether “three children” refers to the number born or the number surviving, and that we
know little for certain about the frequency and severity of its enforcement).
71. See id. at 120 (“Literary, moralistic references abound where [having no children at
all] is seen as disgraceful but, by implication, widespread. . . . Pliny the Elder explicitly
condemns contemporary morals, according to which [the status of being childless and
unmarried] occupies the place of highest [authority] and [power] . . . in sharp contrast (so he
would have us believe) to the ‘good old days.’”).
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not only on self-indulgent men but also on increasingly autonomous
upper-class women, whose wealth and legal rights gave them a
measure of control over reproductive decisions, which they pressed
to the hilt, collaborating with or perhaps overcoming their husbands
in declining to bear children.72 The polemical target was thus male
individualism as well as the relative emancipation of female citizens.
Eighteenth-century France recapitulated the Roman pattern. For
much of the eighteenth century it was widely believed that France
was losing population.73 Picking up ancient tropes linking the virtue
of kings to the fertility of their people, critics of the monarchy seized
on the perceived fertility collapse for polemical advantage.74
Philosophes and republicans developed sociological attacks on the
king, arguing against values and behavior that supposedly undercut
fertility, which they associated with the wealthy and aristocratic allies
of the monarchy.75 The most frequent objects of attack were
“libertines,” aristocratic men who, like their Roman predecessors,
preferred the wealth, freedom, and episodic sexual gratification of a
bachelor (and sometimes a “sodomite”) existence to the duties of
fatherhood.76 In the years before the French Revolution, “the
language employed to denounce celibacy became increasingly harsh,
the proposals more Draconian.”77
This critique was crystallized in an assault on “luxury,” a line of
attack shared by the Marquis de Mirabeau, the abbe Charles-AndreAlexandre de Moy, and the conservative Melchior Grimm, among
many others.78 In this account, “luxury” stood for a preference for
social standing and the pleasures of consumption and self-cultivation
over the expenses and burdens of childrearing.79 Mirabeau proposed
a graduated luxury consumption tax to redirect resources from

72. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 151–69 (outlining the patterns of cultural reaction
to declining fertility).
73. In fact, the opposite was true; mostly because mortality rates were falling, but
shrinking family sizes and the beginning of rural emigration to towns and cities produced the
impression of a desolated land. See BLUM, supra note 10, at 1–4 (2002).
74. See id. at 5–6.
75. See id. at 21–60.
76. See id. at 26–27.
77. Id. at 43.
78. See id. at 45–51.
79. See id. at 46 (“[T]he preference for ensuring a comfortable style of life rather than
producing the largest possible number of children was increasingly and virulently denounced as
morally reprehensible.”).
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pleasure and display to production and reproduction.80 Georges-M.
Butel-Dumont contended in 1771 that the state must go farther and
punish those who remained unmarried.81 Another polemicist argued,
“[i]f it is illegal to commit suicide because that means robbing the
Fatherland of oneself, it should be all the more so to stay single
because each citizen is obliged to contribute . . . his share in [the
nation’s] perpetuation.”82 As in imperial Rome, these proposals
envisaged a direct and powerful claim of the state on the
reproductive capacity of the individual citizen and embraced
authoritarian, even proto-totalitarian, regulation to enforce the
claim.83
Reactionary gender politics accompanied the French pro-natalist
agenda. One polemical target was the alleged effeminacy of wealthy
and especially aristocratic men, portrayed as wigged, made-up,
mincing, and clad in silk.84 Another was the autonomy of upper-class
women who, presumably under the influence of luxurious appetites,
avoided childbearing to preserve themselves for other pleasures. The
pro-natalist Mirabeau described a flighty and self-indulgent new
mother of a first child, a daughter, who declares of her disinclination
to take on another pregnancy: “The job is dreadful . . . and I don’t
feel like sacrificing myself for my posterity.”85 Such gender-specific
polemics have particularly ominous political implications. The literal
occupation of a woman’s body by the child in utero and the
substantial hazard of childbearing (particularly before the advent of
modern medicine) both give pro-natalist legislation an aspect of
intimate coercion.86
80. See id. at 48–49.
81. See id. at 49.
82. Id. (quoting ANGE GOUDAR, LES INTERETS DE LA FRANCE MAL ENTENDUS DANS
LES BRANCHES DE L’AGRICULTURE, DE LA POPULATION, DES FINANCES ET DE L’INDUSTRIE,
PAR UN CITOYEN 272 (Amsterdam, 1756)).
83. Blum provides a number of other striking instances. An anonymous pamphleteer in
1763 wrote that “[l]ibertinage . . . kills millions by preventing the propagation of the species.”
The abbe Jacques-Joseph Duguet declared, “[a]nything opposed to fecundity, even if it’s only
the wish, is criminal and degrades marriage . . . .” According to F.B. Felice, “Onanism is
opposed to the natural destination of sperm . . . the one who engages in it becomes his own
murderer. Still more criminal is the [onanism] committed in marriage.” Id. at 50–51.
84. See id. at 49.
85. See id. at 47.
86. This intuition forms the basis of Jed Rubenfeld’s anti-totalitarian argument for
abortion rights. See Jed Rubenfeld, Concurring in the Judgment Except As to Doe, in WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S
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The French Revolution carried many of these polemical themes
into political struggle and legislation. When the laws of February 13–
19, 1790 abolished clerical vows of chastity, the speaker of the
Assembly declared that the country could no longer tolerate infertile
celibacy: “for reasons both moral and demographic . . . there are
100,000 young women who must be married.”87 Legislative assaults
on the infertile laity were less decisive, but the deputies issued both
pro-natalist policies and rhetoric. A decree of 1791 took the tack of
today’s pro-natalist incentives, reducing personal taxes on the fathers
of more than three children.88 The post-Terror constitution of 1795
excluded the abstentious from the highest levels of government,
providing that “no one may be elected to the Conseil de Anciens . . .
unless he is married or widowed,” that is, unless he had made a
good-faith effort to join the chain of social reproduction.89 The
deputy Louis Depuy announced, “The citizen is the property of the
Fatherland and a part of its wealth”—a radical extension of the
premises of first-generation biopolitics—and urged that childless
unions be declared invalid.90 Another deputy, Charles F. Bouche,
denounced all unmarried persons as “parasites, in general corrupt or
corrupting . . . a useless weight on the face of the earth.”91
This is the pattern of pro-natalist politics. There is not significant
evidence that this pattern is recurring in any important way in
Europe or Japan today. I suggest later that this may be partly a
consequence of women’s well-established equality and partly a result
of continuing revulsion at the eugenic policies of the last century.92
These are early days, however, and it would be naïve to imagine that
the same political pattern could not recur as the effects of declining

MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 109, 111 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter WHAT ROE
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID] (“A woman’s right not to be impressed into unwanted labor is
no less than a man’s. . . . [N]o law could more plainly violate this right than a law forcing a
woman to bear a child.”).
87. BLUM, supra note 10, at 158–59.
88. See id. at 159.
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id. at 158.
91. Id. at 159. Examples abound outside the opinions of lawmakers. In 1794, representtatives of a popular society called (in a twist of retrospective irony) Condom addressed the
Convention, complaining that “regenerated France is still crawling with bachelors” and urging
a declaration “that celibacy is a political crime” and institution of “a heavy punishment upon
those guilty of it.” Id. at 162.
92. See infra Part IV.B.

V.

911

PURDY.PP2.DOC

10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2006

fertility become increasingly palpable. Other connections between
demographic crisis and illiberal politics, while less richly instanced in
history, are less speculative today.
B. The Politics of Pensions and Immigration
An obvious response to the increase in dependency ratios is to
increase immigration of working-age adults and permit them to
stand in for the “absent” native-born adults of a population with
sub-replacement fertility levels. This option, however, would likely
set in motion a political crisis. Immigration on a scale that would
prevent dependency ratios from rising would be much greater than
developed countries have so far embraced. According to a United
Nations estimate, Germany would need to admit 3.6 million
immigrants per year between now and 205093 (against a baseline of
roughly 80 million inhabitants94) to keep dependency rates
constant.95 The corresponding figure would be even more dramatic
in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Japan, where a substantial
decline in absolute population is now projected.96
The numerical challenge is the least of the difficulties attending
immigration. Germany and the rest of Europe have been politically
fractured over current immigration levels, which are too small to
make much of a dent in their dependency ratios. In light of these
political constraints, the Rand Corporation’s European division has
concluded that public policy needed to focus on influencing
domestic fertility because “[t]he sheer numbers of immigrants that
are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and its
Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political
climate prevailing in Europe,” 97 a judgment that preceded the
politically explosive riots among France’s North African immigrants
in fall of 2005.
Policymakers confront two other options, neither politically
attractive. The first is a substantial increase in the age of eligibility for
public pensions,98 the second a harsh cut in the level of pension

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at 35.
Id.
See Old Europe, supra note 31.
See id. at 36–38.
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 9, at 135.
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benefits. While such reform has succeeded on the margins,
particularly in the United States, any changes that approached
offsetting the increased cost from demographic change would likely
be political dynamite. The recent stillbirth of Social Security reform
(even in the relatively market-oriented United States) in a time of
conservative ascendancy suggests the difficulty of revising this class of
entitlements.99 So does the long-running German stalemate between
the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which has so far
blocked any serious reform of that country’s disaster-bound welfarespending commitments.100
Increased immigration has thus emerged as a visible option in
discussions of fertility decline, not so much to point the way to a
solution as to highlight the newly paradoxical relationship between
two aspects of national identity in Europe and Japan: social solidarity
in the form of a generous welfare policy and the expectation of
ethnic homogeneity.101 It was an implicit premise of those countries’
welfare policies that benefits would go to people with whom
taxpayers identified—a pattern of ethno-national spending that
neared perfection in West Germany’s nearly overwhelming decision
to absorb the former East Germany into its welfare state. It now
begins to seem that nothing like the current level of social support
can continue unless Europe gives up even today’s relative
homogeneity in favor of becoming a continent of immigrant
societies.102 To take that path, though, would force the question of
99. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Why Conservatives Are Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005,
at A19 (“Social Security reform appears to be dead for now.”).
100. See Edmund L. Andrews, German Parliament Votes To Revamp Pension System, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2001, at A4 (discussing Germany’s halting efforts at reform); Mark Landler,
An Unlikely German Coalition Now Seems To Be More Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at
A8 (noting the continuing deadlock in German electoral politics).
101. For a discussion of the relationship between nationalist sentiment and social
solidarity with particular reference to the contrasting political cultures of the United States and
Germany, see MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND
THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 220–32 (1995). For the perspective of a leading
German political theorist and public intellectual on this question, see Jurgen Habermas, Open
Letter on Europe, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 31, 2003 (arguing that an ethos
of social solidarity forms the basis of Europe’s rejection of severe inequality). Sociologist
Anthony Giddens makes a similar argument about the essentially cultural-conservative basis of
European social solidarity in Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton in Conversation, in ON THE
EDGE: LIVING WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1, 31–33 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds.,
2001).
102. As the immediately preceding discussion and sources cited therein indicate, the
claim here is not that Europe is in fact homogenous, but that the national political cultures of
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whether welfare-state solidarity could survive absent ethno-national
solidarity, or whether the continent’s transformation by immigration
would transform its political cultures into less solidaristic, more
laissez-faire societies. The second option would push European
countries in the direction of the United States, where relatively open
immigration co-exists with minimal entitlements, so that the country
takes on a low burden of solidarity—whether measured in fiscal
obligations or in collective identification—by admitting foreigners.103
The politics that worked out this question would inevitably
interact with existing rifts over the place of immigrants in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and other European countries. Although
forecasting specific developments in political cultures is usually a
fruitless game—particularly across an ocean and at the scale of
continents—a crisis of solidarity and ethno-national identity suggests
a perfect storm for reactionary conceptions of the national
community as ethnically homogeneous, superior in virtue, and under
threat in its defining traditions and character.
This is a speculative discussion, but not a wildly imaginative one.
The most fractious themes of Europe’s domestic politics are
immigration and the future of the welfare state. Both raise charged
questions about the nature of national community: who “we” are,
what we owe one another, and what the two questions have to do
with each other. Fertility decline brings the two issues face to face in
a manner that may tend to make ideas of national community more
rigid and reactionary at the very moment that practical exigencies
make national populations more heterogeneous.
C. Sex Disproportion and Politics
The most interesting and novel question to arise from sex
disproportion is what it will mean for the very important political
transitions that China and India are now undergoing. In a time when
“the future of Western political theory will be decided outside the
West,” the development of electoral democracy in India, democraticEurope are far from finding a way to reconcile the fact of growing heterogeneity with the
longstanding commitment to generous social supports.
103. Immigration has recently increased in political salience in the United States, driven
not so much by disputes over public benefits as over access to the American job market—the
main economic good that the United States provides its new arrivals. See, e.g.. Shia Kapos &
Paul Giblin, Rallies Sound the Drumbeat on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A18
(describing demonstrations and counter-demonstrations on immigration law reform).
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tending reform in China, and market institutions in both countries
are of great moment.104 Stakes are high for the well-being of the
more than two billion people who inhabit those countries, for the
geo-political order they will either anchor or disrupt, and—as the
quotation just given suggests—for the future of the very institutional
forms China and India are now pursuing and revising.
The first possible consequence concerns the status of women in
society. To the extent that gender equality is a normative aim of
liberal and democratic institutions and an empirical contributor to
the development of these institutions, resurgent gender hierarchy is
bad for political development.105 Unhappily, sex disproportion can
be bad for women’s status. As women become relatively scarce, men
increase competition to control them, which tends to produce early
marriage, high levels of direct discipline of women by men, and, for
the most vulnerable women, increased levels of kidnapping, sale as
brides, and prostitution.106 Although a formalist trained in the
rudiments of economics might imagine the contrary consequence—
that increased demand for women relative to supply would increase
the bargaining power of the women themselves—a bit of realist
reflection reveals the problem.107 Scarcity increases bargaining power
only when women are recognized as formal equals in bargaining, or

104. SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA 198 (1997).
105. I take up this question further at infra Part VI.A.
106. See Scott J. South & Katherine Trent, Sex Ratios and Women’s Roles: A CrossNational Analysis, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1096, 1096–115 (1988).
107. What I have just called a realist attitude would follow the classic analysis of legal
realist Robert Hale in describing private economic transactions as relations of mutual coercion
in which bargaining position depends on the parties’ respective capacity to bring threats to
bear on one another. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3–34, 385–99 (1952) (diagnosing property rights as
establishing economic relationships of reciprocal threat and exploring modes of legal
mitigation and equalization of threat). Joseph W. Singer has continued to do important and
theoretically ambitious work in Hale’s vein. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 650–51 (1988) (“As Hale tried to teach us, every transaction
takes place against a background of property rights. And the definition, allocation, and
enforcement of those entitlements represent social decisions about the distribution of power
and welfare. No transaction is undertaken outside this sphere of publicly delegated power; the
public sphere defines and allocates the entitlements that are exchanged in the private sphere. At
the core of any private action is an allocation of power determined by the state.”). One might
also look at the issue as a matter of cultural or interpretive context, as Charles Taylor does in
describing negotiation as involving a number of implicit presuppositions, including the nature
and value of the persons involved. See Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,
in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15, 32–33 (1985).
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at least are practically able to withhold the resources they control.
When the holder of the resource—in this case, a woman’s own
person—cannot withhold it because of legal disability or material
vulnerability, an increase in the value of the resource means a greater
chance that she will be coerced into giving it up. Thus, there may be
an unhappy relationship between sex disproportion and resurgent
hierarchy in gender relations where, as in both India and China,
women’s positions are already subordinate and vulnerable.108
The second possible consequence is the rise of potentially antidemocratic and illiberal institutions, either to absorb populations of
unmarried men or to address the anti-social behavior associated with
such men. The military is the foremost public institution suited to
absorb unmarried populations; a large and restive military is also an
independent political actor with potentially anti-democratic goals.
These goals may or may not extend to coups or other overt power
struggles. They may well include pressure for destabilizing
adventures intended to establish—for reasons of both funding and
status—the importance of the military. The potential for overt power
struggles is particularly great in government made vulnerable by the
uncertainties of political reform, as China seems increasingly to be;
the potential for dangerous adventurism is manifest in China’s
relations with Taiwan and India’s with Pakistan.
Domestic police forces are also likely to grow in response to
unmarried male populations. China announced in 1999 that it would
substantially increase the size of the People’s Armed Force, which is
charged with “maintain[ing] internal stability by quelling domestic
unrest and rioting.”109 The increase was a response to labor and
political unrest, some of it associated with the transient population.
Interestingly, unmarried men may be the members of the People’s
Armed Force as well as its targets: the new recruits have been
described as “the dregs” of current army personnel. Any armed locus
of authority, particularly one that works at the intersection of
ordinary law-and-order and political repression, can pose a danger to
liberal and democratic political development.
Perhaps the most troubling question is whether unmarried
young men are particularly likely recruits for extremist movements,

108. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 74; see also id. at 73 (noting women’s
low rates of literacy and employment in India, relative to those of men).
109. Id. at 256.
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particularly their violent or para-military wings. India has been
plagued by such organizations, mostly Hindu nationalists, since
before its independence in 1947. The Shiv Sena, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and others have been responsible for
religious massacres, harassment of both minorities and religiously
tolerant governments, and one of the founding wounds of Indian
politics: the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi.110 While political
movements are tightly controlled in China, nationalism stands
alongside economic growth as a pillar of the present government’s
legitimacy, and ultra-nationalist sentiment is known to be strong
among many young Chinese.111 The role that ultra-nationalists
would play in a Chinese political crisis cannot be more than
speculation, but it could hardly be good for liberal democracy.
In material terms, nationalist groups offer their members an
opportunity for economic advancement chiefly through patronage
and participation in organized crime, particularly extortion.112 This

110. For the role of Hindu nationalist parties—particularly the Shiv Sena—in Indian
politics, see SIKATA BANERJEE, WARRIORS IN POLITICS: HINDU NATIONALISM, VIOLENCE,
AND THE SHIV SENA IN INDIA (2000); ASHOK DHAWALE, THE SHIV SENA: SEMI-FASCISM IN
ACTION (2000); JULIA M. ECKERT, THE CHARISMA OF DIRECT ACTION: POWER, POLITICS,
AND THE SHIV SENA (2003). For a propagandist’s defense of the program of the RSS, see
M.G. CHITKARA, RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH: NATIONAL UPSURGE (2004). The career
of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai and the surrounding state of Maharashtra combines nationalist
rhetoric, street-fighting ethnic self-assertion, social-service provision, and community-building.
Young men, particularly those who face limited employment prospects in the migrant slums of
Mumbai, make up the organizational core of the party and the bulk of its militants. Dhawale
gives a characteristic left-wing inflection to this fact: “An extremely vital element in the [Shiv
Sena] social strategy was its appeal to unemployed and lumpenized youth[.]” DHAWALE,
supra, at 73. Banerjee offers a somewhat more subtle account, noting that Shiv Sena
organizations provided three kinds of benefits to the young male members who were the
primary targets of recruitment: economic opportunity (chiefly through patronage and
extortion), concrete social networks, and an ideology of membership or belonging in an
imagined, essentially Hindu Indian identity. See BANERJEE, supra, at 111–13. Membership in
nationalist organizations addresses several of the needs described in the earlier sociological
sketch of the characteristics of populations of unmarried men. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
111. See Geremie R. Barme, To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde
Nationalists, 34 CHINA J. 209 (1995) (detailing the rise of a fashionable form of ultranationalist sentiment among young Chinese). For a discussion of the dynamics of Chinese
nationalism from a cultural and anthropological perspective, see CHINA INSIDE OUT:
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM (Pal Nyiri & Joana
Breidenbach eds., 2005).
112. See BANERJEE, supra note 110, at 112–23 (describing economic benefits as a major
part of Sena recruitment efforts to those who otherwise lack prospects); DHAWALE, supra note
110, at 64–74 (detailing the appeal of the Shiv Sena to economically marginal youth and the
party’s general benefit from economic crisis).
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appeals to young men who tend to fare poorly in the legitimate
economy. In social terms, nationalist organizations provide
community centers, shared activity, and an environment of solidarity
in which those who are blocked from other modes of social
integration, such as marriage and employment, can enjoy belonging
and recognition in their otherwise unattached status.113 Ideologically,
nationalism provides an abstract community—the nation—with
which those otherwise socially displaced can identify emotionally;
moreover, violent nationalism assigns these young men an honored
role: warriors, the defenders of a nation in which, without nationalist
ideology, they might lack any substantial place.114 In this respect,
nationalism at once valorizes the violent terms of status in
populations of unmarried men and proposes to integrate that groupspecific status into a position of honor within the national
community. In an irony that is at once poignant and unsettling,
nationalist ideology sometimes places special emphasis on the
warrior’s role as a defender of the nation’s womanhood, particularly
against the depredations of an internal alien, such as India’s Muslims.
Men who lack erotic, emotional, and social ties with actual women

113. See BANERJEE, supra note 110, at 117–18. She also favorably discusses the work of
other observers who argued that “the Sena offered young Maharashtrians a sense of
exhilaration not derivable solely from monetary gains,” but rather dependent on a sense of
community built around discipline and order inflected by a spirit of “national solidarity.” Id. at
118 (quoting MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, ETHNICITY AND EQUALITY: THE SHIV SENA
AND PREFERENTIAL POLICIES IN BOMBAY 114 (1979)). On these accounts, “‘the Sena men
. . . saw themselves [as] . . . unaccommodated men making a claim on their land for the first
time, and out of chaos evolving their own philosophy of community and self-help.’” Id.
(quoting KATZENSTEIN, supra, at 97).
114. Banerjee writes, “Many young men were . . . attracted by the Sena’s advocacy of
violence as political tool . . . . Speeches . . . emphasized aggression, framed by a Hindu
identity, as a legitimate and necessary element of political action.” Id. at 112. On the role of
warrior identity and masculinity in Hindu nationalist politics, she describes the debt of both
the RSS and the Shiv Sena to celebrations of a “warrior” tradition in Indian history and
nineteenth-century Hindu revivalism, and observes, “Notions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘Hinduism’
intertwined closely in the political identity implicit in the Shiv Sena’s message. ‘Masculinity’—
incorporating such attributes as decisiveness, aggression, muscular strength, and a fighting
spirit to do battle—juxtaposed feminine values, labeled as weakness . . . nonviolence,
compassion, and consensus building.” Id. at 132–33. In her excellent discussion of Sena
ideology, Eckert reports, “Violent action is considered not only as honest but further as
courageous and manly . . . . This insistence on the true man being defined by physical strength
and physical, nearly unmediated, violence, exemplifies the theme of the ‘recuperation of
masculinity’” as a major appeal of the Sena. ECKERT, supra note 110, at 136.
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are thus invited to imagine themselves the protectors of the nation’s
femininity.115
In this Part I have outlined the potentially disruptive relationship
between biopolitics and the broader politics of nation, public
morality, and warfare. I have argued that both historical precedent
and current trends suggest that population decline and skewed sex
ratios can produce or strengthen nationalist and reactionary politics.
In the next Part, I put these developments in a broader context: the
development and transformation of Euro-American biopolitics over
the last three centuries.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BIOPOLITICS
In addressing conjoined demographic crises and political threats,
the world is not writing on a blank slate. The effort to formulate a
political response must contend with the morally troubling legacy of
centuries of history. In this Part, I survey that history and its
implications for contemporary biopolitics.116
An opening word is in order on the relationship between
biopolitics and the basic commitments of modern liberal and
democratic politics. On the one hand, the basic normative
commitment of modern politics is to secure the freedoms of persons:
we assess states by how closely they adhere to these principles,
recently to the point of authorizing intervention and overthrow
where states are grossly illiberal and undemocratic. Yet on the other
hand, there is no perfect autonomy in politics because we are also,
inevitably, resources for the state. In order to enforce a relatively free
115. For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra note 110, at
140–47.
116. In contrast with the intercontinental focus of this article’s discussion of demographic
trends, this treatment of the historical stages of biopolitics is rather centered on the political
and legal cultures of the North Atlantic. It would not really be accurate to describe China or
India as having gone through the same first- and second-generation experiences that I ascribe
to Europe and, in a lesser degree, the United States. In this respect, the historical material
describes the origins and trajectory of the normative lenses through which readers trained in
the North Atlantic legal cultures, or that of the post-World War II international human rights
period, are likely to understand the relationship between individual reproductive choices and
state interests. My rationale for treating this relatively restricted history is that the problems
that define third-generation biopolitics really are ones that we—all the world—are in together,
and in which the relationship between social or state interests and substantive reproductive
autonomy comes into the same kind of difficulty and paradox whatever the historical normative
developments behind it. I am thus writing for my audience a regional history of “our”
response to what is now, in its broad outlines, a global problem.
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social order, even a state entirely free of totalitarian ambitions makes
demands on the wealth, the conduct, and the bodies of its citizens.
Concentrating here only on the last—the concern of biopolitics—
citizens show up for jury duty; they report for prison, or are taken
there; and, when there is war, they show up to fight and die. Our
role as resources for the state is inevitable because our autonomy
depends on the survival and integrity of the state.
Preserving autonomy, therefore, requires distinguishing between
cases where personal autonomy and the health of the state are
reconcilable and others where they come into conflict. It is necessary
to avoid two kinds of mistakes: first, overestimating the necessary
extent of state regulation and thus excusing gratuitous invasions of
autonomy; and, second, underestimating the need for state
regulation and remaining sanguine about uses of autonomy that can
produce serious problems for the state. The challenge of thirdgeneration biopolitics—to reconcile the commitment to reproductive
autonomy with recognition of its systemic political implications—is a
new and important instance of this general problem.
A caveat is in order here. This discussion of the history of
biopolitics is egregiously incomplete. It concentrates on political and
cultural developments in Europe and North America to the exclusion
of developments in other regions under discussion in this article,
notably India and China. My reason is neither that I believe those
countries’ experience can be assimilated to that of the North Atlantic
(quite the contrary) nor that I believe they lack comparably deep and
vital engagement with these issues.117 Rather, I am motivated by two
kinds of limitations. One is a limitation in my audience, which for
this article is almost exclusively made up of American legal academics
whose training is predominantly in North Atlantic traditions. The
other, which disposes of the issue, is my own regrettable lack of
training to summarize the history of biopolitics in non-Western
traditions.
The above-discussed French obsession with fertility as an
expression of national vitality or decline—the fruit of the king’s just
rule and a barometer of virtue and vice in the population—began as
117. For a recent, book-length demonstration of this point, see AMARTYA K. SEN, THE
ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY (2005)
(arguing throughout that Indian thought richly engages a variety of political, theological, and
cultural issues, often ethnocentrically imagined to be the exclusive product of Western
intellectual history).
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part of an old tradition of magical association between fertility and
the health of the realm. By the decades following the French
Revolution, however, that obsession had become a policy aim
steering the regulatory apparatus of the early-modern state. This aim
was premised on the main idea of the first 150 years of biopolitics,
what I call the “First Generation” biopolitics: that citizens and
subjects were in good part resources for the nation, and that, like any
important resource, they merited appropriate regulation in the
national interest. With the end of World War II and the rise of new
attention to reproductive autonomy, this premise came into
disrepute, replaced by the main idea of “Second Generation”
biopolitics: reproductive decisions belong to individuals, and any
legitimate interest of the state lies in public morality and the wellbeing of persons, not the maintenance of a pool of material resources
composed of living human bodies. Moreover, such state interests are
set against the premise of individual reproductive autonomy. The
problems of “Third Generation” biopolitics emerge against the
backdrop of the repudiation of the First Generation and the rise of
the Second Generation.
A. Thomas Malthus and Demographic Pessimism
First Generation biopolitics can surely claim Thomas Malthus
among its founders. Malthus enjoys the rare distinction of having
bequeathed his name to a view of the world, one premised on the
application to human beings of a putative biological principle: “the
constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the
nourishment prepared for it.”118 He applied this principle to human
beings in the form of a simple and grim cycle in demographics and
economics. Whenever wages (or other income) rose high enough to
support fertility above the replacement rate, human beings
responded with offspring.119 A rising population meant a larger
workforce, which drove down wages to the point of privation, even
starvation.120 “The poor,” Malthus wrote, “consequently must live

118. THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 14 (Donald
Winch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1803).
119. See id. at 25–26. Malthus wrote of this principle: “The passion between the sexes
has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered, in
algebraic language, as a given quantity.” Id. at 40.
120. See id. at 25–26.
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much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress.”121
The distressed poor would be unable to afford to marry or bring
their children alive through infancy, which would induce a fall in
population.122 This in turn would drive wages high enough to
support reproduction at or above the replacement rate, beginning
the grim cycle again.123
I devote several pages to Malthus’s views for two reasons. First,
he is seminal in the development of North Atlantic biopolitics,
having inaugurated an alliance between would-be scientific social
inquiry and the already familiar and recurrent anxiety about the
demographic health of the nation. Second, the connection between
Malthus’s intense conservatism and his biopolitical commitments is a
stark reminder that biopolitics is political in quite a familiar sense:
interpretations of demographic trends interact with and are often
inflected by the fears, aspirations, and convictions of those who make
them. It is partly with the reactionary legacy of Malthus in mind that
I have undertaken this article, in the face of a new set of
demographic crises, with an explicit commitment to securing and
expanding substantive versions of liberal and democratic freedoms.
Although he is now remembered in intellectual shorthand as a
pessimist who failed to appreciate that rising productivity would
enable a finite world to feed many more people than it once could,
Malthus was very much a practitioner of demographic politics.124 The
son of a radical minister who had embraced the French Revolution as
an emblem of the promise of human improvement, Malthus turned
sharply against his father’s political optimism.125 His theory is very

121. Id. at 25.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 25–26.
124. It is worth noting that although Malthus seems to have envisioned a steady-state
economy and is, thus, routinely criticized for failing to anticipate that productivity increases
would enable a finite world to feed a growing number of people, his thesis does not depend on
the steady-state premise. On the contrary, the thesis that population will always increase in
excess of the resources available to support it can apply at any level of productivity increase that
does not outstrip the maximum potential rate of reproduction. Such a view, for instance, seems
partly to have underlain Marx’s contention that the development of capitalism would lead to
the steady impoverishment of the proletariat. For a discussion of the connection between
Malthus and Marx in this respect, see David Singh Grewal, The Demographic Contradiction of
Capitalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
125. See Donald Winch, Introduction to MALTHUS, supra note 118, at vii (describing
Malthus’s father as “an ardent follower of Rousseau” and likely “attracted by [William]
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much about the limits of politics; he argued relentlessly that
unyielding tendencies in human nature constrained the power of
political reform to improve human circumstances.126
Malthus did concede that human reproduction differs from that
of other species because people make self-conscious decisions in
accord with plans of life.127 He referred to “preventive checks” on
population as unique to humans, while “positive checks,” forming
the cycle of overreach and privation sketched above, held for all
forms of life.128 He classified the uniquely human preventive checks
into “moral restraint,” meaning celibacy or at least continence, and
“vice,” which included all “irregular gratifications” of the sexual
desire, all of which he regarded as degrading to human dignity and
especially to female character.129 He does not seem to have regarded
regulation of “vice” as an appropriate goal of public policy. He
treated moral restraint as a product of gradual increases in individual
virtue, expressing doubt that even education in his demographic
principles would persuade the poor to limit their reproduction.130
Malthus’s polemical targets were visionary reformers. The thrust
of his argument was that neither wealth redistribution nor other
reforms in the economic or political order could improve the human
lot because, by inducing the poor to reproduce faster, they would
only intensify the cycle of expansion and privation. Malthus thus
devoted a great deal of his Essay to deriding the programs of socialist
reformers—including Marquis de Condorcet and Robert Godwin—
and to attacking England’s laws for support of the poor.131 The more
ambitious the reform, the greater the burst in fertility and the

Godwin’s anarchistic vision of a perfect egalitarian society without government or social
hierarchy”).
126. See id. at ix (“Malthus embarked on a life-long attempt to show that those who
attributed human suffering to defective social and political institutions overlooked one of its
perennial sources and were guilty of fundamental error.”).
127. See MALTHUS, supra note 118, at 21–22.
128. Id. at 21.
129. Id. at 22–23.
130. Malthus suggested that “mere knowledge of these truths” might “not operate
sufficiently to induce any marked change in the prudential habits of the poor.” Id. at 330. He
did, however, insist that his thesis did not deny the possibility of progress but only restricted its
possible sources: “To the laws of property and marriage, and to the apparently narrow principle
of self-love, which prompts each individual to exert himself in bettering his condition, we are
indebted for . . . everything that distinguishes the civilized from the savage state.” Id. at 331.
131. See id. at 45–123.
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immiseration that would follow.132 Moreover, under conditions of
want, an egalitarian allocation of property would give way to
resurgent proletarianism as hungry laborers succumbed to hard
bargains. Soon enough, the division between workers and owners
would be restored, however visionary the plan of reform that had
sought to replace it.133 Thus Malthus drew from his demographic
principles a lesson of political quietism:
That the principal and most permanent cause of poverty has little
or no relation to forms of government, or the unequal division of
property; and that, as the rich do not in reality possess the power of
finding employment and maintenance for the poor, the poor
cannot, in the nature of things, possess the right to demand them,
are important truths flowing from the principle of population[.]134

The purpose of his argument was thus “less . . . to propose new
plans of improving society, than to inculcate the necessity of resting
contented with that mode of improvement which is dictated by the
course of nature,” that of incremental individual growth in the virtue
of self-restraint.135
B. The Vicissitudes of Human “Improvement”
The marriage of demographic science and policy science that
Malthus proposed became the core of first-generation biopolitics,
although usually with more robust aims than Malthus’s, which were
132. Malthus’s treatment of Godwin’s egalitarian program takes this argument in its
strongest form, imagining a society of perfect equality in which demographic crisis and
reversion to inequality promptly follow as a result of demographic laws. See id. at 56–67.
133. See id. at 65–67.
134. Id. at 329.
135. Id. at 327. Again, Malthus was hardly a pure reactionary. He expressed hope that
“the representative system,” by improving the standing of poor members of the community,
would give them both something to hope for and something to lose, thus inducing a greater
measure of prudence. Nonetheless, his constant theme was skepticism of reform. He wrote:
But though the tendency of a free constitution and a good government to diminish
poverty be certain; yet their effect in this way must necessarily be indirect and slow,
and very different from the direct and immediate relief which the lower classes of
people are too frequently in the habit of looking forward to as the consequence of a
revolution. This habit of expecting too much, and the irritation occasioned by
disappointment, continually give a wrong direction to their efforts in favour of
liberty, and constantly tend to defeat the accomplishment of those gradual reforms
in government, and that slow melioration of the condition of the lower classes of
society, which are really obtainable.
Id. at 253.
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mainly proscriptive. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, the premises of biopolitics remained that (1) individual
reproductive decisions had a substantial effect on the national
interest and (2) policy decisions could legitimately take account of
this interest in seeking to influence or dictate reproductive patterns.
This stage of biopolitics carried an obsession with “improving”
human stock that laid the groundwork for the poisonous eugenics
movement of the twentieth century. As early as the opening decades
of the nineteenth century, English reformers concerned with
ameliorating the condition of the industrial working class joined
Malthus’s belief that overpopulation caused poverty to a nonMalthusian confidence that scientific progress could induce rapid
improvements in well-being.136 These reformers broke with
Malthus’s identification of birth control as “vice,” taking it instead as
a critical instrument of progress.137 In the following decades,
American utopians, such as those in New York’s Oneida community,
attempted new modes of sexual regulation, including “male
continence” (which depended on refraining from ejaculation, and
would certainly have struck Malthus as “vice”) and “stirpiculture,”
an Oneida eugenic practice aimed at improving the race by selective
breeding and innovative childrearing.138 Like many utopian gestures
in that period of American history, those practices only made explicit
aspirations that were widespread in less articulate forms as Americans
experimented with new modes of autonomy in a world of increasing
choice. For instance, without any change in reproductive
technologies, the fertility rate dropped by one child per white
woman between 1830 and 1850, twice the decline of the previous
thirty years.139
Later in the century, biopolitics became linked to a statist
utopian program that anticipated full-blown racialist eugenics.
Operating without a well-founded genetic account of inheritance,
reformers connected the qualities of children with the state of mind

136. See LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH
CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 39–44 (2002) (distinguishing between Malthus’s pessimism
and the reformism of some who took their cue from him).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 44–52.
139. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 163–64 (1984)
(attributing these developments to a new interest in control over one’s own body as part a
general flourishing of democratic attitudes and practices).
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of the parents at conception, and, thus, argued for loosening or
abolishing marriage laws to produce children born of love, not duty,
who would accordingly display superior moral qualities.140 Other
radicals of the post-Civil War period argued that increasing equality
for women would “improve the race” along all dimensions, as
women with power over their reproductive choices would (1) have
fewer children to avoid the risk to health and life of childbearing, (2)
choose fathers with an eye to the genetic patrimony of their children,
and (3) conceive and bear children in a state of mind that would
produce good qualities in offspring.141
At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the
twentieth, biopolitics turned toward the anti-immigrant and whitesupremacist eugenics that persists in infamy.142 Demographers
warned that falling birth rates among native-born (and especially
educated) white Americans, coupled with the high fertility of
immigrant groups, could result in the complete replacement of the
first population by the second.143 Sounding anti-feminist (as well as
pro-natalist) themes from pre-Revolutionary France and even
Augustan Rome, the enemies of “race suicide” assailed educated and
wealthy women, whom statistics showed to be slow breeders, and
warned that women’s participation in the workforce detracted from
their roles as wives and mothers.144 President Theodore Roosevelt in
1905 attacked women who avoided having children as “criminal
against the race . . . the object of contemptuous abhorrence by
healthy people.”145 Across the Atlantic, the same anti-feminist and
anti-decadence themes sounded in the Germany of World War I,
where the importance of healthy bodies as a national resource came
to the fore in the long slaughter of trench warfare.146 Much the same

140. See GORDON, supra note 136, at 73–77.
141. See id. at 80–85. Although Gordon presents this species of optimism as quaint, I
believe it has some value when stripped of pseudo-scientific pretensions. In fact, my argument
in the latter portions of this article runs along the same lines.
142. See id. at 86–104.
143. See id. at 88 (discussing this warning, issued by demographer-sociologist Robert
Hunter).
144. See id. at 86–89.
145. Id. at 86. (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE
PAPERS (1910)).
146. See Elisabeth Domansky, The Transformation of State and Society in World War I
Germany, in LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN: TWENTIETH-CENTURY POPULATION
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response followed World War I in France, where in 1920 the
Chamber of Deputies overwhelmingly passed an anti-contraceptive
measure, an emblem of both the “almost universal support” for pronatalist values and “the new willingness of the French state to
legislate on its behalf.”147
However pernicious were the eugenicist programs that preceded
World War II, the slide of scientific and pseudo-scientific
demographic policy into genocide marks a horrific rupture in history
and conscience which needs no rehearsal here. The aggressively pronatalist nationalism of Nazi policy was part and parcel of the
eliminationist hatred toward “non-Germans” and “non-Aryans,”
particularly Jews. As the West struggled to absorb the crimes of the
world’s most literate and scientifically advanced country, talk of “race
suicide,” of improving the national stock, and of the duty to produce
for the nation all took on an aspect of the criminal, torrid fascist
fantasy of ethnic sameness, of a nation without strangers. In
retrospect, there was horror hidden (or not so hidden) in the
pragmatic defenses of German sterilization policy in the American
eugenicist, Eugenical News; the matter-of-fact transmission of
German eugenicist claims about Jewish rates of inherited disorders in
the Journal of American Medicine;148 and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s pronouncement in Buck v. Bell that “[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough.”149 After such knowledge, what forgiveness?
There was little for the idea that the physical health of the national
community, conceived in racial terms or in the imagery of fertility
and virility, could be anything other than a marker along the way to
totalitarianism.
C. Second-Generation Biopolitics: The Turn to Autonomy
The end of World War II ushered in a set of changes that moved
biopolitics decisively away from the conception of persons as state

MANAGEMENT IN A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 46–66 (Amir Weiner ed., 2003) [hereinafter
LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN].
147. Mary Louise Roberts, The Dead and the Unborn: French Pronatalism and the
Abortion Law of 1920 , in LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN, supra note 146, at 91–92.
148. See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 297–301 (2003). I have avoided drawing on the
arguments of this polemical book, but it contains considerable archival research on the
eugenicist and other medical literature of the period shortly before the Holocaust.
149. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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resources and instead made reproductive choice a basic dimension of
a new conception of autonomy—one based in keeping the state out
of decisions about intimate relations. One overwhelming negative
motive drove this change: horror at what eugenic politics had
wrought in Nazi Germany. The change also had several affirmative
sources, which developed partly in response to eugenic
totalitarianism and genocide. One was the rise of international
human-rights culture, with its universalist commitment to securing
individuals against state abuses.150 Another was the women’s
movement, which brought trans-Atlantic and eventually global
demands for women’s equal social, economic, and political
participation, and whose leaders and members were almost uniformly
committed to reproductive autonomy.151 A third, specific to the
United States, was the turn of the Constitutional jurisprudence of
personal autonomy from the Lochner-era concern with rights of
property and contract in a free-labor economy to the post-New Deal
emphasis on securing individual conscience and life-path, including
choices about childbearing and intimate relations.152 A final and
150. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (effective Sept. 3,
1981) (committing signatories to provide “[a]ccess to specific educational information to help
to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family
planning”); id. at art. 12 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family
planning.”).
151. See GORDON, supra note 136, at 242–78 (discussing the interaction of the women’s
movement and abortion law and politics in the United States between the late 1930s and the
late 1970s); Dorothy McBride Stetson, Introduction: Abortion, Women’s Movements, and
Democratic Politics, in ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC
STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM 1, 1–16 (Dorothy McBride Stetson ed.,
2001) (discussing the relationship between women’s movements and abortion law in Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, and
Italy).
152. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 150–62 (1991)
(describing Griswold and its progeny as interpretively transformed applications of the deepseated constitutional principle of protecting essential interests against state interference). For a
flavor of the theories of autonomy that have sprung up around the jurisprudence of abortion,
see Reva Siegel, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 86, at
63 (arguing that “criminal abortion statutes . . . coerce pregnant women to perform the work
of motherhood” and cannot survive the principles of equal citizenship embodied in the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution), and Jed Rubenfeld,
Concurring in the Judgment Except As to Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID,
supra note 86, at 109 (denying that “the law [can] force women to bear children against their
will” and finding in constitutional autonomy jurisprudence a repudiation of the long history in
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critically important factor, which produced a massive increase in
reproductive choice even where autonomy-based principles of sexual
equality were weak or nearly absent, was the advent and diffusion of
inexpensive and effective contraceptive technology, which greatly
increased the degree of choice in conception even independent of
legal abortion rights; similar developments in abortion technology
increased the real capacity of women to control childbearing even
where abortion remained illegal, and considerably increased the
efficacy of the right to abortion where it was protected.153
The implicit empirical supposition of the era of reproductive
autonomy is that individual reproductive choices do not produce
aggregate results in which the state has a legitimate interest sufficient
to justify coercive reproductive policy. Justice Jackson’s famous
observation that the Constitution is not a suicide pact154 implies an
empirical judgment about the operation of fundamental rights: that
in the vast majority of circumstances, individual autonomy will be
compatible with the political governance, economic operation,
military security, and intergenerational reproduction of the polity.155
The prominence of reproductive autonomy in second-generation
biopolitics, similarly, supposes that reproductive autonomy is not a
demographic suicide pact.156 The two trends that this article has
explored—population decline and sex disproportion—present a basic

which “societies have found ways to keep women from deciding freely whether or when they
will bear children”).
153. See Susheela Singh et al., Abortion: A Worldwide Overview, in THE
SOCIOCULTURAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 15–49
(Alaka Malwade Basu ed., 2003) (surveying incidence and safety levels of abortion worldwide).
154. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
155. For a discussion of how changing facts may alter the balance among competing
principles and pare back the domain of autonomy, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER
EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004) (arguing that many features of
everyday freedom suppose the good faith of others, which a prevalent terrorist threat
undermines).
156. Neo-Malthusian arguments that population growth was out of control persisted
throughout the period of second-generation biopolitics. Although those who were alarmed by
population growth argued for a state interest in the aggregate results of reproductive decisions,
their conclusions tended to support the agenda of reproductive autonomy inasmuch as they
sought to promote family planning measures. Some, of course, crossed the line into support
for China-style controls on family size, which set them athwart the spirit of second-generation
biopolitics. For a sample of both aspects of this position, see EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note
17, at 202–19 (arguing that education and economic opportunity are the best long-term tools
for reducing population growth, but also evincing considerable sympathy for China’s one-child
policy).
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challenge to the coherence and viability of second-generation
biopolitics: the possibility that individual reproductive decisions can
produce aggregate results with serious consequences for the wellbeing of the entire polity.
Having laid out the historical background to today’s biopolitics,
I now turn to the first of two discussions of partial but promising
solutions. In the next Part, I argue that novel financial arrangements
can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing on the
international level to make up some of the demographic asymmetries
produced by declining fertility within countries while avoiding the
political hazards of achieving the same benefits through immigration.
This approach may provide some help in threading the needle I
described earlier in Part III.B: the unhappy conjunction of two crises
in the European and Japanese ideas of solidarity; the first, a financial
crisis in the welfare state, and the second, a change in the ethnic
homogeneity that social solidarity has long presupposed.
Before starting this discussion, I should note that I do not
admire ethnic homogeneity as a basis of national identity—quite the
contrary. I propose a way to save parts of the European and Japanese
models of social solidarity because the alternative may be worse, and
because I believe solidarity is a value worth carrying forward into a
more heterogeneous world. Changing everything at once brings risks
better avoided. One of the major aims of public policy should be to
affect the direction and sequence of sweeping changes to preserve
the good that they endanger while taking advantage of the good
potential that they bring. My proposal in the next Part is in that
spirit.
V. INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING:
A MODEL FOR BIOPOLITICAL PUBLIC POLICY
An effective approach to the problems of today’s biopolitics
requires engagement on several fronts: in the “core” biopolitics areas
of reproduction and childrearing, and in the closely related fiscal and
political crises that new demographic developments portend. While it
would be stretching the concept of biopolitics too far to sweep in all
public policy that responds to demographic crises, it is appropriate to
count as biopolitics any policy that has two features. First, it is
intended as a response to the problems generated by reproduction,
childbearing, and other core issues in the governance of the human
body. Second, in its design, biopolitical public policy acknowledges
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and seeks to take advantage of realities such as declining fertility and
skewed sex ratios, directly engaging those problems in an attempt to
extract opportunities from them. In this Part, I describe an approach
to transnational fiscal policy that provides a model for biopolitical
public policy in general. This model describes an imagined contract
for international and intergenerational burden-sharing. It begins in
biopolitical reality: plummeting fertility rates in rich countries
produce a world where certain countries have very high dependency
ratios, while others, including much of Asia and Latin America, now
have proportionately large working-age populations. Moreover,
slow-growing and falling populations in rich countries and still fastgrowing populations in poorer countries intensify another major
difference between regions of the world: some, such as Europe, are
rich in capital and increasingly poor in labor, while others, such as
India, are rich in labor power—that is, in human bodies—but still
hungry for capital.
A public policy for a new set of biopolitical problems should ask
whether there is a way to take advantage of these international
asymmetries to mitigate the fiscal effects of demographic change. As
noted earlier, the traditional way to do this is for regions with high
dependency ratios and capital-labor ratios to permit immigration to
swell their adult workforce.157 Yet massively increased immigration is
probably politically unviable in most European polities and
xenophobic Japan. In both hemispheres, hostility toward foreigners
and skepticism about the possibility of integrating newcomers
politically and culturally have produced calls for new immigration
restrictions, the opposite of what fiscal solvency would require.158
While there have also been calls for opening international labor
markets, they have come mostly from commentators on the far left
and have had little traction among mainstream students of
international relations, let alone politicians and voters.159
157. See supra discussion and notes in Part III.B.
158. See supra discussion and notes in Part III.B. For a discussion of Japanese
xenophobia, see Norimitsu Onishi, Ugly Images of Asian Rivals Become Best Sellers in Japan,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1 (describing popularity of racist, xenophobic graphic novels);
Norimitsu Onishi, Japanese Find a Forum To Vent Most Secret Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2004, at A1 (describing popularity of a xenophobic Japanese internet bulletin board).
159. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONI NEGRI, EMPIRE 396–400 (2000) (calling for
open migration). For a discussion of paucity of attention to open labor markets even among
those who strongly advocate open markets in capital and goods, see David Singh Grewal, Is
Globalization Working?, 20.2 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 247–59 (2006) (reviewing MARTIN
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A novel form of fiscal policy offers a chance to achieve some of
the benefits of labor migration without absorbing its political cost.
This is just the sort of innovative approach that a biopolitical public
policy requires.160 The model, proposed by Yale economist Robert
Shiller, rests on the new technological viability of complex contracts
for the sharing of risk and benefit across large populations over
time.161 Shiller proposes that the capacity to gather and analyze
unprecedented amounts of data lays the technological groundwork
for what he calls “macro-markets”: index funds that would make
possible investment in entire economic sectors or even national
economies. He envisions, for instance, an agreement between
nations to share portions of their GDP to compensate for
performance above or below a specified baseline of expectation,
making possible some hedging against national-level economic
WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2005) and JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBALIZATION (2004)).
160. As I note, this proposal is not original to me, although I believe its application to
this problem is original. I lack the training to defend it in full detail, either theoretical or
institutional—i.e., I have neither an economics Ph.D. nor experience as a financial analyst or
risk broker. Moreover, this proposal is a different sort of animal from the material on
substantive freedom that I treat in the next Part and which makes up the bulk of my proposals
to address the problems of third-generation biopolitics. My reasons for including this proposal
nonetheless are that (1) it seems inevitable that a suite of policy responses will be necessary to
mitigate the demographic and political problems I am tracing; every bit helps; (2) institutional
experimentation may take flight on the wings of necessity, so that an idea that seemed farfetched under ordinary circumstances would seem worth a try under exigent ones; and (3) it is
a familiar role of the law professor to engage in disciplinary arbitrage, advancing certain ideas
not by refining their formulation but by proposing to apply them in previously unfamiliar
domains where they have something to offer.
161. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2003). The general form of Shiller’s proposal concerns the implications of new data-gathering
and information-management technologies for risk-pooling. See id. at 110–20. Pooling risk
through private and social insurance is, of course, one of the great advances of modern
economic life, enabling individuals to diffuse losses that would otherwise be financially
devastating by replacing the risk of massive costs that one must bear alone with a probabilitydiscounted periodic or lump-sum payment in the form of an insurance premium. Notoriously,
however, insurance is dogged by moral hazard: the tendency of individuals who can externalize
the costs of their actions to behave in riskier ways than they otherwise would, whether by
driving recklessly or—where the insurance is income support—by accepting unemployment
and collecting checks. Shiller proposes that collection and aggregation of data for the entire
sector or region of the economy in which the insured participates, rather than the individual’s
employment status or income, can enable an insurer to differentiate between losses that reflect
sectoral changes beyond the individual’s control and others that are merely local to the
individual. In a scheme of income support based on such data, payments would be based not
on individual income, but on whether the average income of sector participants had fallen
below a specified baseline.
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downturns.162 These would not be charitable arrangements, but selfinterested contracts aimed at blunting the edge of bad luck. One can
imagine, for instance, the benefits to regional stability of a contract
that would have given Argentina’s and Indonesia’s governments a
share of China’s booming national income during the disastrous
financial contractions those countries experienced at the turn of the
millennium. One can imagine the appeal to all parties of entering
into such an agreement ex ante, when none knew which would
experience a short-term fiscal crisis and which a continuing
expansion.163
This concept could form the core of a biopolitical public policy.
Labor migration—the solution Europe, Japan, and Korea are likely
to resist for political and cultural reasons—is an individual response
to differences in wage rates (adjusted for cost of living, availability of
employment, and so forth) across nations. These rates, in turn,
reflect the ratio of labor to capital in each economy, with high-capital
countries paying more for relatively scarce labor and plentiful labor
taking low wages in relatively low-capital countries.164 In a borderless
world where the costs of migration were zero, populations of
workers would rearrange themselves—as capital has already begun to
do—until a single, global average wage emerged for each
occupation.165 Liberalization of international labor markets would
allow workers in low-wage countries to take advantage of high
European wages with some dragging effect on European wage rates,
but also with the more-than-offsetting benefit of increasing the
population of workers paying into Germany’s social pension system.
The question is whether a complex international financial
arrangement might take advantage of the same differential without
moving bodies across borders. Could it, that is, take advantage of

162. See id. at 175–85.
163. For information on the Indonesian financial crisis, see Steven Radelet & Jeffrey
Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, in CURRENCY CRISIS 105 (Paul Krugman
ed., 2000). For information on the growth of China, see Keith Bradsher, China Reports
Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C5 (reporting
9.9% growth in Chinese GDP in 2005, a figure in line with the last fifteen years of growth).
164. This is, of course, a simplified picture, particularly in its neglect of the human capital
dimension of labor, which significantly affects the marginal economic value and, thus, the wage
rate of workers.
165. This account leaves out the determinants of variation in wages within a single labor
market, such as compensation for geographically undesirable locations. The exposition is
deliberately simplified, but not to the point of distortion.
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biopolitical facts to address biopolitical problems without creating
the crisis in domestic politics that this article has warned might result
from European and North Asian demographic contraction?
Here is the form such a contract might take. The governments of
Germany, Japan, the European Union, or all of these commit for a
period of two decades to subsidize public investments in education,
public-health, and infrastructure in India and China. In return, the
Indian and Chinese governments commit a share of their future
GDPs, roughly from the decades of working life of the cohorts that
benefit from the rich countries’ payments, to the governments of the
investor countries. These payments will subsidize the public pension
plans of the investor countries when their “missing” workers (those
not born under a sub-replacement birthrate) would otherwise have
been contributing payroll taxes to the national fisc.
These contracts would take advantage of the same resource
differentials that drive labor mobility. The developing countries are
rich in population (particularly young population) relative to their
supply of capital for health and education to raise the value of their
rising cohorts. The rich countries, by contrast, are rich in capital but
relatively poor in population, particularly the working population of
the coming generation. Under the contract envisioned here, the rich
countries’ capital would help prepare the next working generation in
labor-rich and capital-poor countries for productive careers. In
return, workers in the latter countries would effectively become
payers into the public pension systems of the capital-rich countries,
replacing a portion of their diminishing working-age populations.
These expenditures would not be foreign aid, but rather in the
nature of investments. The contracts would enable capital-rich, highwage countries and labor-rich, low-wage countries to take advantage
of asymmetric levels of development without incurring the political
costs of massive migration. Such a contract could be written as a risksharing instrument at both ends so that the investor country’s
contributions would be contingent on its GDP during the years of
its payment, or could be based, like many investments, on fixed
payments by the investor in return for a share of a designated pool of
wealth or income later.166 The investment structure of the contract
166. Of course, the poor countries’ repayments might also be fixed, which would provide
some assurance for rich-country pension plans but considerable disincentive to poor-country
governments reluctant to shoulder the burden of carrying European or Japanese retirees,
regardless of their financial capacity to do so.
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would produce incentives, usually missing from foreign aid, for the
investing countries to monitor and police performance in the
expenditure of their investments.
Would returns from the investment be meaningful? Consider the
returns from an index fund in the Chinese or Indian economy
nowadays, when those two are doubling every seven and ten years,
respectively.167 The contract proposed here would be a way for a
country, or its pension system in particular, to make an investment of
this form. The terms of the contract, of course, would depend on the
parties’ forecasts for the performance of the developing economies,
but that is nothing unusual in an investment contract.
The attractiveness of an investment in this form would also
depend on how the investing companies construed their alternatives.
Specifically, it would be reasonable to compare the costs and benefits
of alternative approaches to the fiscal problems that come with
fertility decline. Earlier sections of this article have laid out the high
costs of doing nothing at all: a massive increase in the dependency
ratio and a potentially crushing burden on public pension systems.
This section opened with a discussion of the political costs of
reducing the dependency ratio by increasing immigration levels: a
rise in nativist sentiment and backlash against liberalized
immigration. As I note below, what may be the most attractive
solution—pro-natalist policies aimed at reconciling family and
work—comes at a high fiscal cost and seems, from the experience of
France and the Nordic countries, to cushion but not avert the effects
of fertility decline. Therefore, absent some new strategy, reciprocal
international investment would seem a fiscally attractive and
politically viable way to approach the problem. Naturally, there is no
reason that adopting one solution would exclude simultaneously
pursuing another. The aim would be an optimal mix of strategies,
measured both in present cost and in risk-discounted levels of
expected benefit. At a minimum, the contract envisioned here would
be a strong candidate for a place in that mix.
Would countries receiving payments in the early stages of the
contract pay their obligations later? There is no easy way to repossess
years of investment in health and education, and geriatric countries

167. As noted at supra note 163, China’s annual rate of growth has been around ten
percent. India’s annual growth rate has been in the neighborhood of seven percent. See Saritha
Rai, India: Growth, Still Strong, Slows, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at C4.
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are not, other things equal, the most likely to go to war to collect
their pension payments.168 These concerns are not empty, but
countries have a remarkable record of faithfully repaying debt, even
when the obligations date back to now-repudiated regimes or the
payments make up unconscionable shares of public expenditure.169
History provides as much reassurance as could reasonably be asked
that governments would honor the debts envisaged in these
hypothetical contracts.
In this Part, I have argued that one partial solution to the
problem of declining fertility lies in novel financial arrangements that
can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing among nations.
The solution does not concentrate directly on increasing fertility
levels. Rather, it mitigates the effects of declining fertility levels in
developed countries by taking advantage of international variation in
dependency ratios across time. I have suggested that this partial
solution is a model of biopolitical public policy, an approach to
biopolitical problems that acknowledges and seeks novel ways to take
advantage of the same biopolitical facts that produce those
problems—in this case, internationally varying dependency ratios. In
the next Part, I turn to a “core biopolitics” approach to both
declining fertility and sex disproportion: promoting women’s
substantive freedom in reproductive and childrearing decisions.
VI. WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT, SEX RATIOS, AND FERTILITY:
THE CORE OF BIOPOLITICS
Both declining fertility and sex disproportion are intimately
linked to the level of “substantive freedom” that women enjoy. By
substantive freedom, I mean not just what women are formally
permitted to do, but what they are in fact able to do.170 For instance,
168. Although superficially flip, the point that aging countries are relatively unlikely to
project force in international relations is a serious contention of analysts concerned with
fertility decline. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 20–21.
169. See SHILLER, supra note 161, at 180 (pointing out that such obligations are
generally honored even in exigent circumstances).
170. This distinction tracks the “substantive” definition of reproductive autonomy that I
gave for purposes of this article. See supra note 5. As there, I do not mean to make any point
about the desirability or importance of a focus on formal freedom or nominal legal permission
to act in a certain way. Rather, I am simply interested in a more inclusive metric of freedom,
which I find captures many phenomena that motivate this paper. There is, of course, a serious
problem in measuring substantive freedom as a “greater” or “lesser” quantum; a problem that
generally plagues any effort to measure human well-being in an objective or “cardinal” rather
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while the absence of a censorship law might constitute formal
freedom to read about feminism or family planning, only literacy,
combined with access to books, pamphlets, or online pages, would
count as substantive freedom to read. Similarly, while women might
be formally allowed to enter the labor market, unequal education, a
husband’s threat to punish a wife for working, or the sexist attitudes
of potential employers would all weigh against counting women as
substantively free to work.171 Because these distinctions may seem
fairly abstract and their content will vary from context to context, I
will now break down the argument by way of particular cases.
A. Women’s Empowerment and Demographics
1. The contours of the problem
The basic strategies for addressing sex dispropor-tion are to ban
sex selection, to appeal to culture by raising the status of women,
and to appeal to economic interest by decoupling family income and
retirement security from the sex of children. The obvious ways of
pursuing each strategy turn out to be unsatisfactory because they are
relatively ineffectual.172

than a subjective or “ordinal” sense; a problem, that is, for any attempt to judge aggregate
human welfare or flourishing other than by revealed preferences. For information on the
intellectual origins and continuing relevance of this problem, see Robert Cooter & Peter
Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507
(1984) (describing the rise of ordinalism as a Kuhnian paradigm shift that made some
questions tractable by setting aside others, rather than a simple advance in methodological
insight). I do not purport to solve that problem here, but rather to concentrate on the
implications of substantive increases in freedom in particular domains: literacy, workforce
participation, and, in consequence of these, participation in the decision making of the
household. In these specific domains, if not in social aggregates at large, it is possible to say (1)
what the object of inquiry is, i.e., what we are talking about, and (2) whether we are looking at
more or less of it in a particular context. It may be that an attention to substantive, objective,
or cardinal measures of well-being or capability requires this kind of move to the particular, but
I leave that question to another time.
171. Sen has developed this position in many essays. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY
AND FREEDOM 501, 583, 659 (2002) (including the sections Markets and Freedoms,
Opportunities and Freedoms, and Freedom and the Evaluation of Opportunity); SEN, supra note
66; AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 509 (1997) (including the
section Goods and People).
172. At this point, I suspect that morally motivated opponents of abortion will respond
that I have tipped my ideological hand by ignoring the straightforward alternative of banning
all or most abortions. It is my strong impression that, as a purely practical matter, the
arguments advanced here about the ineffectiveness of bans of particular medical technologies
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Begin with prohibition: banning (in order of increasing
generality) sex-selective abortion, pre-natal sex-identification, or
technology that enables that identification (regardless of its other
uses). Of course, outright bans on technology such as ultrasound
and amniocentesis bring their own costs in forgone medical capacity.
Moreover, the effectiveness of prohibition is uncertain at best. Where
the technology is available and parents want to use it, the procedures
they seek seem to take place. Maharashtra, the state where Bombay
lies, banned abortions that follow sex-determination tests in 1988.173
The juvenile sex ratio there in 2001, however, stood at 109:100,
more lopsided than in the majority of Indian states and more
pronounced than in Maharashtra in 1991.174 The use of ultrasound
technology for prenatal sex determination is illegal throughout
China, which has not yet driven down the sex disproportion.175
There is, then, reason to doubt that bans on use of medical
procedures for sex-selection purposes are effective, at least under
present cultural and administrative conditions.
Changing economic incentives seems to make a difference, but at
a high price. Experiments in China’s Zhejiang province suggest that
instituting old-age pensions can indeed reduce the sex disproportion
at birth.176 The main difficulty is that, thanks to the one-child policy,
China’s fertility rate now stands at 1.70 children per woman,
compared to 4.86 in 1970–75.177 The speed of that demographic
contraction significantly outpaces even those of Europe and Japan,
which thirty to forty years ago had much lower fertility rates than
China’s. China’s dependency ratio will thus skyrocket in the coming
decades, regardless of future trends in birthrates. Moreover, for all its
extraordinary economic growth, China remains on the whole a poor
country; one plagued by both administrative difficulty in tax
collection and serious, long-term uncertainty as to its political

apply a fortiori to bans on procedures that may be performed by a variety of technologies.
Although a commitment to both formal and substantive reproductive autonomy is among the
normative priors of this article, in this instance I think purely practical considerations are
enough to settle the question.
173. See HUDSON & DEN BOER , supra note 4, at 111.
174. See id. at 105.
175. See id. at 246–47.
176. See id. at 245–46 (citing 6.3 Brides for Seven Brothers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998,
at 58).
177. See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at 67.
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stability.178 If rich countries face serious questions about sustaining
public pensions through demographic contraction, the problem
holds for China a fortiori. Besides the raw fiscal difficulty of making a
Chinese pension program work, political uncertainty would reduce
the effect of announced pension benefits on expectant parents.
Discounting for the possibility of state failure or crisis leading to a
change in the policy, many would still seek to have sons to insure
against the disappearance of promised benefits.
Raising the status of women is both attractive in concept and
highly uncertain in practice. The power of state policies to induce
cultural change of this sort is uncertain. China’s state education
system is sex-neutral and has produced near-universal basic education
for women but has not averted the present sex disproportion.179 Nor
does economic development seem to address women’s status
automatically by, for instance, promoting egalitarian ideas. In India,
the sex ratios for affluent, educated families are often worse than for
poorer families.180 Moreover, the low valuation of women feeds back
into the shaping of economic reality: given lower priority than their
brothers, pressed to marry, treated as subordinates by their
husbands, and regarded as second-rate by employers, women will
not in fact enjoy the same earning power as men, even when they
attain the same level of education and are not formally barred from
the workplace.
Nonetheless, the feedback between economics and culture runs
in both directions, and women who manage to make good on new
economic alternatives may be able to demand better treatment in
their personal lives and incrementally change their cultural status.181
The problem is to find the right sequence of changes to set in

178. For a survey of these problems from a modestly polemical but informed perspective,
see GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001).
179. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 252.
180. See id.
181. In the notes accompanying the next section, I cite a variety of authors—many
particularly interested in South Asia—who develop this argument. Within the legal academy,
my proposal to understand how distinct but intersecting spheres of activity interact in
producing or inhibiting substantive freedom owes most to Madhavi Sunder. See Madhavi
Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 561–62 (2001) (describing women’s
empowerment as achieved partly through complementary capacities to dissent or resist
coercion in both the public and the private spheres); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112
YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (describing the same).
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motion a cycle of increasing equality for women. I address that
problem in the next section.182
2. Women’s substantive freedom: The key to a cycle of reform
As noted, sex ratios do not necessarily improve with general
indicators of progress in well-being. Amartya Sen reports that
“variables that relate to the general level of development and
modernization either turn out to have no statistically significant
effect, or suggest that modernization . . . can even strengthen, rather
than weaken, the gender bias in child survival.”183 Such general
indicators of development as urbanization, male literacy, the
availability of medical facilities, and the level of poverty either fail to
mitigate the sex disproportion or intensify it.184 Falling poverty rates,
in particular, are sometimes associated with an increase in the sex
disproportion.185
None of this is particularly counter-intuitive, given a family
preference for sons over daughters. Wealth and medical resources
increase power over reproduction. Male literacy means access to
information about medical procedures, urbanization means
proximity to sophisticated medical technology, the prevalence of

182. For China, at least, lifting the one-child policy would seem a straightforward way to
reduce the effect of preference for sons on the sex ratio of newborns. The limits of this
measure, however, are evident in the results of an inadvertent natural experiment: Taiwan,
which does not restrict the childbearing decisions of its citizens, has a male-female sex ratio of
104.3:100. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 62. While significantly better than the
figure for mainland China, this number suggests that cultural valuation of sons and their
superior earning power exercise independent influence on sex selection. Taiwan has a mixed
public-private pension system, with mandatory contributions to private schemes, but
considerable problems with compliance and little allowance for movement from firm to firm or
sector to sector by workers in the private economy. Although new reforms promise a more
effective system with fewer gaps, one cannot say that Taiwan avoids the Chinese economic
incentive to have male children as a form of retirement insurance. Taiwan is thus at best a
partial control, relative to China, for isolating the influence of the cultural preference for sons
on sex-selective abortion. See Shean-Bii Chiu, Taiwan: Compulsory Occupational Pensions Still
Dominate, Int’l Conference on Pensions in Asia 6–7 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished paper, on file
with author) (discussing gaps and inequities in Taiwan’s pension system); President Chen Shuibian, President Chen’s National Day Address (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.gio.
gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/20051010/2005101001.html (discussing pension reform).
183. SEN, supra note 66, at 197.
184. See id.
185. See id. These figures refer to the sex ratio in the overall population and in the
population surviving early childhood. I say more later about the implications for the sex ratio
at birth.
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medical facilities speaks for itself, and growing wealth brings the
capacity to pay for procedures such as pre-natal sex-determination
and abortion. Generally speaking, greater resources will mean greater
capacity to bring about family desires, and millions of family-level
decisions will register as systemic demographic effects.186
What is interesting is to disaggregate the family, asking whether
the preference for sons is common to all members or enforced by
husbands, and, if the latter, under what conditions women might
enforce a contrary preference. On this point, there is provocative
evidence regarding sex disparities in early-childhood survival. While
general indicators of development do not mitigate this disparity, two
other variables do reduce sex inequality in children’s survival:
women’s literacy and women’s labor force participation.187 These are
indicators of development, but they are also, specifically, indicators
of the level at which women have participated in the benefits of
development. These data suggest that as women gain practical
capacity, they enforce a relatively sex-equitable use of family
resources, with great benefits for the survival of female children.
In making sense of this phenomenon, it is helpful to follow Sen
in treating families as sites of “cooperative conflict.”188 In this model,
partly congruent and partly conflicting individual interests (including
values and beliefs, which may of course include commitment to the
family itself as a unit distinct from the sum of its parts) yield a
“solution” for the family’s use of resources. The solution includes
both a set of priorities and a set of decision-making procedures for
setting or balancing priorities.189 A solution may be either relatively
egalitarian or relatively inegalitarian, both in its acknowledgement of
the preferences of different family members and in the role it gives

186. See ALAKA MALDWADE BASU, CULTURE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND
DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR, ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF INDIA 227 (1992) (arguing
that the reason sex ratios in childhood survival sometimes worsen with increases in income is
the corresponding increase in access to relatively high-quality medicine, which families with
strong son preference will generally reserve for boys).
187. See id. at 160–81 (surveying and interpreting findings to this effect from India and
elsewhere, including Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa).
188. See id. at 221. For a particularly helpful discussion and elaboration of Sen’s model,
see BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA
53–81 (1994).
189. See AGARWAL, supra note 188.
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each family member in setting priorities.190 Applying this model to
the issue of childhood survival suggests that, while a generic increase
in the resources available to the family does little to make the
solution more sex-egalitarian, an increase in women’s capacities
enables them to enforce egalitarian solutions. How far literacy and
access to work increase the standing, self-confidence, or other factors
of “voice” within the family, and, alternatively, how far they change
negotiating positions by creating an “exit” option into an alternative
life is unclear, but some combination of effects is intuitive.191 What
seems clear, however, is that when they can, women tend to enforce
a use of family resources that supports the survival of girls as well as
boys.
It does not follow from this that women’s empowerment also
diminishes sex-selective abortion. That would depend foremost on
why women insist on sex-equitable solutions within the family: for
190. See id. As Agarwal points out, the variables that figure here are not just control of
resources, but also cultural ideas of which issues are at stake in negotiation and which are so
clearly settled as to be off-limits to bargaining. See id. at 73–75. Another important variable is
which conditions women perceive as “problems” (whether or not open to negotiation) bearing
on their well-being, or that of their children, and which are accepted (preceding even the
question of negotiability) as untroubling. Sen and Nussbaum have emphasized the importance
of an idea of false consciousness in this connection, suggesting that experience of
empowerment reveals interests previously obscured from the interest-holder. See SEN,
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 171, at 65, 90–92; Martha Nussbaum, Charles
Taylor: Explanation and Practical Reason, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 232–41 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). Others have argued that the poor are always in some
measure aware of their disadvantage and simply require practical opportunities, not enhanced
insight, to challenge it. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS
OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985). Although I tend to follow Sen and Nussbaum in believing
that exposure to new experiences and ideas can revise one’s estimation of one’s interests—and
that to believe the contrary would be more condescending than even a crude “false
consciousness” view—the present argument does not require a judgment on this point.
Increased capacity, or substantive freedom, is open to interpretation as either a source of
insight into one’s interests or an instrument for pursuing and enforcing interests already
recognized. For reasons to believe that self-understanding frames any negotiating process, see
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 34–37
(1985) (arguing for the place of self-understanding in constituting activity such as politics or
negotiation).
191. The reference, of course, is to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For his
part, Sen notes “considerable evidence that when women can and do earn income outside the
household, this tends to enhance the relative position of women in the distributions within the
household.” SEN, supra note 66, at 194. He also suggests that literacy and education make
women aware of alternatives and give them some confidence in insisting on the legitimacy of
their desires. Id. at 198–99. The phenomenology of these suggestions is of mixed voice and
exit, which seems right.
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reasons of sex egalitarianism or out of love for existing children.
Mitigation of sex disparities in childhood survival rates might reflect
indiscriminate love for children already born, meaning mothers
would stick up for their living daughters but not refuse sex-selective
abortions. Alternatively, sex-neutral maternal concern might extend
to potential children. As a third possibility, empowered mothers
might be resisting the valuation of male over female lives in general.
If either the second or third alternative explained a significant share
of the improvement of girls’ survival rates where women are
empowered, then women’s increased capacities should also translate
into successful resistance to sex-selective abortion, and thus to
improved sex ratios at birth.
Moreover, it would be artificial to imagine that the motives
women bring to bear on reproductive decisions are constant,
changing only as women’s capacity to effect their aims waxes and
wanes. In fact, economic power and cultural status are intuitively
connected here. An increase in women’s capacity will bring new
experiences that, in turn, all but ensure new priorities for both
women and men.192 Where women work outside the home and can
read, the result is a different set of everyday interactions,
expectations, and experiences of capacity, all redounding to women’s
sense of agency in general and to the goals and priorities they set.193
192. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing Sen, Nussbaum, and Taylor
on this issue). This is a kind of moral-psychological corollary of the growing recognition that
women’s agency is a critical factor in economic and social development; not merely in the
passive sense that it makes women bearers of greater quanta of well-being, but in the active
sense that women’s empowerment contributes to development processes that affect both
women and men. This thesis is the thrust of the discussion in SEN, supra note 66, at 189–203.
For a recent summation of arguments and data supporting this view, see Isobel Coleman, The
Payoff from Women’s Rights, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2004, at 80, 83 (“Educated women
have fewer children; provide better nutrition, health, and education to their families;
experience significantly lower child mortality; and generate more income than women with
little or no schooling. Investing to educate them thus creates a virtuous cycle for their
community.”).
193. See AGARWAL, supra note 188, at 421–66 (describing in several case-studies, as well
as theoretically, how struggles over resources are also “struggles over meanings,” that is, over
what women’s and men’s interests are and how they should count). “Struggles” should be
underscored: women’s increasing control of resources has often resulted in both violence and a
recrudescence of male-supremacist politics. See id. at 271–76 (describing such reactions). The
view that changes in economic structure and opportunity and changes in individual values go
hand in hand appears to find confirmation also in the decline in native-born white American
fertility rates around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which prompted pro-natalist
warnings of “race suicide.” Summarizing historians’ views of that period, Linda Gordon
concludes, “The economic reorganization that made smaller families more economical also
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3. Fertility and women’s substantive freedom
In this sub-part, I return from sex ratios to the other half of my
biopolitical discussion: the analytically distinct and geographically
separate problem of sub-replacement fertility. Thus, we are once
again primarily discussing the reproductive decisions of women and
families in the richest developed regions. The common thread of the
argument is that increases in women’s substantive freedom in each
context should be a powerful element in any strategy to address the
biopolitical crisis of that setting, whether it is missing women or
missing heirs. Of course, the particular elements of substantive
freedom at issue will differ from place to place.
In wealthy, broadly liberal settings such as Europe (and to a
lesser degree Japan and South Korea), the basic substantive freedoms
that count so much for women’s well-being in poor countries are
secure. The relevant question is not whether women are
substantively free (i.e., are in fact able) to enter the workforce and to
influence family decisions about resources and reproduction. The
relevant question instead involves the structure of the tradeoffs
women and families confront in making the decisions that shape a
personal life and a career: whether to enter a reproductive
partnership, whether to have a first child, whether to have a second
or third child, whether to enter and remain in a career, whether to
leave the workforce. While there may be neither formal nor
significant practical barriers to a woman’s making any one of the
decisions just listed, the opportunity cost of each may be such that
certain combinations of choices are effectively impossible. If rich and
poor alike are free to sleep under the bridges of Paris, so, too, are
women free to leap those bridges in a single bound, with a child on
one hip and a briefcase on the other. How many women will be able
to do so is another question.
It is, moreover, a question that public policy can influence. As
noted, Philip Longman has argued that the cost to a middle-class
American family of raising a child through age seventeen is about
one million dollars, the lion’s share in forgone wages by one
parent.194 Longman’s contention is that American families would
made upper- and middle-class women eager for broader horizons, which in turn made them
desire smaller families.” GORDON, supra note 136, at 100–01.
194. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 72–75 (summarizing his argument and cost
estimates).
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prefer to have more children than they in fact do, but they are
deterred by the cost of childrearing.195 Thirty-eight percent of
French parents report that three children is the ideal number for a
family, but fewer than 15 percent have that number.196 As noted,
German poll results suggest a preference for family size below the
replacement rate,197 but this preference may in part reflect
recognition of the costs of childrearing.198 These figures suggest that
public policy increases the substantive freedom of women and
families when it reduces the opportunity costs of bearing and rearing
children in terms of workplace participation, and vice-versa.199 An
increase in substantive freedom along these dimensions, all things
equal, will mean increasing the number of children families have by
reducing the marginal cost of each. Put differently, the goal would
be reconciliation of two kinds of choices: the choice to bear children
and the choice to work. Reconciliation has been the goal of French
family-support policy since 1994, and it has come along with an
increase in the country’s fertility rate in recent years, after three
decades of decline.200 Moreover, France’s fertility rate has passed 1.9,
making it the highest in the European Union (tied with Ireland) and
significantly higher than those just below it, Luxembourg (1.78) and
Finland (1.73).201 The country’s fertility rate is high despite the fact
that France has one of the EU’s highest rates of two-earner families,
with 70 percent of those including two full-time workers.202 Eightyone percent of women with one child and 69 percent of women with
two children are in the workforce.203 These figures suggest that
France’s goal of reconciliation has found some success.

195. See id. at 81–85 (reporting that United States women and families express a wish for
more children than they in fact have).
196. See Hugh Schofield, Joy for France As Population Goes Boum, SUNDAY HERALD,
Sept. 25, 2005, available at http://www.sundayherald.com/print51878.
197. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
200. See Marie-Thérèse Letablier, Fertility and Family Policies in France, 1 J.
POPULATION & SOC. SECURITY 245 (2003), available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/webjad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_6/9.Letablier.pdf.
201. See id. The most recent report is of a rate approaching 1.92. See Schofield, supra
note 196.
202. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 256.
203. See id. at 255.
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Several kinds of transfers, targeted subsidies, and state-provided
services work to reduce the cost of French children to their parents.
Direct per-child payments (beginning once a family has two
children) set a baseline, with both payments and tax breaks rising
further for families with three or more children.204 Paid maternity
and paternity leave policies rise to a three-year income entitlement
for mothers (and occasionally fathers) of a third child who opt to
leave work for that period.205 Most significant for the goal of
reconciliation is an extensive scheme of child care, including statefinanced nurseries for children under three, schools beginning at age
three, and tax-breaks and subsidies for in-home child-care.206 The
effect is to reduce a panoply of childrearing costs: the danger of
losing one’s job, the direct cost of care, and the income loss from
forgone employment. The ultimate goal is to soften the often stark
choice between bearing and raising children and remaining
employed.
It is instructive to contrast the French experience with those of
other European countries. Indeed, Europe presents a laboratory of
experimentation with fertility policy. Spain, which since the end of
Franco’s fascist regime has pursued a passive policy that relies on
families to make reproductive decisions and to care for their own
children, has gone from having Europe’s second-highest fertility rate
in 1971 to one of its lowest today.207 Germany provides relatively
generous welfare-state support, but, until recently, it has offered little
in the way of subsidized care for the pre-school children of working
mothers, and it gives significantly shorter maternity leaves (at
fourteen weeks) than France.208 The country’s overall family-support
policy, while it consumes 2.7 percent of GDP, consists of
pocketbook transfers that create no meaningful infrastructure to

204. See id. at 246–50; Schofield, supra note 196.
205. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 250; Schofield, supra note 196.
206. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 250–57; Schofield, supra note 196.
207. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 137. As with all such comparisons in Europe, there are
confounding variables. Spain has experienced persistent unemployment among young people,
which has probably interacted with a relatively new sexual libertarianism to delay childbearing
or to inhibit it for reasons partly independent of state policy. See also Surkyn & Lesthaeghe,
supra note 6, at 47 (noting the timing of Spain’s adoption of post-traditional values); David C.
Unger, An Immigration Experiment Worth Watching in Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at
A12 (noting a persistent Spanish unemployment rate around ten percent).
208. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 95 (noting additionally that only five percent of preschool children of working mothers received subsidized child care).
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reduce the burdens of child care and directly reconcile work and
family.209 German fertility rates remain much lower than France’s, as
the high opportunity cost of childbearing presses the average age of
mothers at first birth to nearly 30.210
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Norway,
follow a family-support policy much nearer France’s, emphasizing
reconciliation of work and family. They enjoy commensurately
higher fertility rates. Norway guarantees forty-two weeks of paid
maternity leave, about three-fifths as much paid paternity leave, and
an option of either tacking on a year’s unpaid leave or accepting
substantial, income-scaled subsidies for child care.211 Sweden
provides 390 days of paid leave, which parents can divide as they
wish (except for sixty days set aside for the secondary care-giver, a
gesture toward gender equity).212 Public childcare, which in
Scandinavia has always aimed at reconciling work and family on
ground of gender equity, enables about two-thirds of Swedish
mothers with young children to work outside the home.213 A
remarkable feature of Swedish demography is that fertility is “procyclical,” that is, positively related to women’s earnings and
employment levels, suggesting that Sweden’s policies of
reconciliation have substantially reduced the tradeoff between
women’s equal economic participation and childbearing.214
That such policies are costly hardly needs remarking. Crudely
put, they are subsidies for the production of a valuable resource:
replacements for the present generation of workers and taxpayers.

209. See
Europe:
Kinder,
Gentler;
Germany’s
Declining
Population,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2003, at 39 (describing child-care facilities as “poor or non-existent” in
the West German welfare state and noting that childrearing “has traditionally been considered
a private not a public matter” in Germany).
210. See id.
211. Marit Ronsen, Fertility and Public Policy – Evidence from Norway and Finland, 10
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH art. 6, 146–47 (2004). Ronsen’s longitudinal study of Norway and
Finland did not find expansion of public child care correlated with an increase in fertility, but,
as Ronsen noted, this unexpected and counter-intuitive finding likely reflects the fact that child
care emerged at a time of increasing female participation in the workforce, and thus interacted
with a growing commitment to work and increased opportunity costs in child-bearing. Id. at
160. The relevant question is the difficult counter-factual of what would have happened had
women entered the workforce in large numbers without the benefit of public child care—
specifically, whether fertility might have fallen to something nearer German levels.
212. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 124.
213. See id. at 125.
214. See id. at 130.
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Regarded as a subsidy they are open to plausible justification: parents
absorb much of the cost—and all the employment-based opportunity
cost—of their children, while reaping only a tiny and diffuse share of
their children’s later contribution to the economy.215 The massive
positive externalities of children are sufficient economic reason to
encourage their production.
A complementary rationale is the increase in women’s substantive
freedom which reconciliation policies produce. This freedom is
valuable, not just because it induces higher fertility rates, but also as
a social goal in itself. In developing countries, increases in
substantive freedom press fertility rates downward as women exercise
newfound agency to resist pro-natal norms that have long been
enforced by direct coercion or lack of meaningful alternatives.216 In
wealthy countries, however, the effect may be the opposite: with
expanded sets of viable choices, women and families are particularly
interested in reconciling several kinds of goods, such as career and
childrearing. There, an increase in substantive freedom will mean an
increase in fertility rates over present levels, which partly reflects the
costly tradeoffs of choosing to have children. A society of greater
substantive freedom to reconcile such complementary goals is a freer
society.
As noted earlier, such policies may not increase fertility to the
replacement rate in many rich societies. Estimates of the elasticity of
parents’ decision to bear children even in France suggest as much—
although one must bear in mind that such indifference curves are
artifacts of personality and culture, not natural kinds.217
Replacement-level fertility, however, need not be the standard of
success. Policies that can mitigate the effects of fertility decline while
increasing substantive freedom are desirable in both respects, even if
they cannot carry the whole weight of the task.

215. See LONGMAN, supra note 26 (discussing Philip Longman’s analysis of the cost,
including opportunity cost, of raising a child).
216. For a discussion of the remarkable effect on fertility rates of the indicia of women’s
substantive freedom, particularly labor market participation and literacy, see SEN, supra note
66, at 198–99.
217. Researchers estimate the elasticity level of demand for children in France to be 0.2,
suggesting that fiscally viable subsidies can press fertility upward, but not to replacement level.
See Guy Laroque & Bernard Calanie, Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?,
http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/apmicro/am05/salanie-051215.pdf.
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B. Women’s Empowerment and Democracy: A First Pass

The falling fertility rates of rich countries and the rising sex
disproportion of poor countries both conjure up alarming political
associations. In Europe, particularly, perceptions of demographic
decline are historically associated with reactionary and authoritarian
politics. In India and China, as elsewhere, large populations of
unmarried young men are ideal recruitment targets for ultranationalists and other extremist movements. In the last Part, I
argued that increases in women’s substantive freedoms can mitigate
the two demographic crises, and thus also diminish their
consequences. Here, I present tantalizing evidence that women’s
substantive freedoms may also have a direct effect on politics,
tending to make extremism and authoritarianism less potent. If this
is true, then women’s empowerment is an apt response to the
demographic crises on both the level of demography and the level of
politics.
One of the most provocative forays into this issue is by political
scientist M. Steven Fish.218 Fish was drawn to the question of why
predominantly Islamic countries are less democratic than others,
even correcting for levels of economic development (widely
acknowledged to correspond to democratic governance).219
Dissatisfied with the claim that Islam is culturally hostile to
democracy in some ill-specified way, Fish introduced a new
independent variable: the subordination of women, as measured by
women’s literacy, sex ratios in the living population, and the
percentage of high government posts occupied by women.220
The preceding discussion suggests that the first two are
particularly apt indicators, as literacy affects women’s substantive
freedom in family and social life and sex ratios express women’s
agency or lack of it. Taking as a dependent variable the numerical
assessment of democratic governance assigned each country in the
world by the nongovernmental organization Freedom House, Fish
found that each of his indicators of women’s subordination
significantly reduced the explanatory power of a country’s

218. See M. Steven Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism, 55 WORLD POL. 4 (2002).
219. See id. at 13–14 (stating that the link between Islam and authoritarianism “is too
stark and robust to ignore, neglect, or dismiss”).
220. Id. at 24–28.
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predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic population makeup.221 Fish
offered several provisional theoretical speculations about the causal
story behind these findings. Perhaps male domination in family and
social life sows authoritarian habits of arbitrary power in some,
craven subordination in others, and diminishes the expectation that
power in general should be answerable to either egalitarian principles
or demands for reason-giving.222 Perhaps the integration of women
into a variety of social, economic, and political contexts induces
different, less authoritarian behavior in the men of those contexts.223
Perhaps, for whatever reasons, women tend to hold attitudes less
conducive to authoritarianism than men, such as weaker tastes for
domination and hierarchy or a preference for cooperative or
consensual problem-solving.224

221. See id. at 25–29. (“Women’s status . . . on the whole . . . appears to account for part
of the link between Islam and authoritarianism.”).
222. See id. at 30–31. This view finds support from some commentators within the
Muslim world. See ABDELLAH HAMMOUDI, MASTER AND DISCIPLE: THE CULTURAL
FOUNDATIONS OF MOROCCAN AUTHORITARIANISM 44–143 (1997) (arguing for a causal
connection between patterns of interpersonal domination and submission and political
authoritarianism); HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED CHANGE
IN ARAB SOCIETY 26–60 (1988) (arguing in a similar vein).
223. See Fish, supra note 218, at 30–31. This model would depend on the socialpsychological effects of negotiation and bargaining. For a discussion of recent research in the
social psychology of reciprocity, with particular attention to its relevance to legal questions, see
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV.
71 (2003). Brain researchers have also found that areas of the brain associated with emotions
and social engagement are activated in individuals who show high levels of trust and
reciprocity, potentially suggesting that training in reciprocal negotiation induces motivation to
further reciprocity. See James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35
NEURON 395, 395–405 (2002); Kevin McCabe et al., A Functional Imaging Study of
Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11832, 11832–
35 (2001). I discuss the historical development of the moral psychology of reciprocity as an
idea in political economy and law in Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1253–58 (2005).
224. See Fish, supra note 218, at 30–31. This view is associated with “difference
feminism,” the position that women tend to a distinct and characteristic set of values and
attitudes that are salutary in social and political life. For a classic statement of this view, see
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and Morality, 47 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 481 (1977) (criticizing Lawrence Kohlberg’s account of moral learning, with its
emphasis on application of abstract principle, as insufficiently relational and contextual, and
identifying women’s perspectives with the latter qualities). For a psychoanalytically informed
version of a similar perspective, see NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173–219 (1978) (arguing
for a relationship between deeply embedded gender characteristics reproduced through parentchild relations and the social and institutional structure of liberal capitalism).
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This is not the place to attempt an assessment of these
competing but potentially complementary explanations. For my part,
I am intensely skeptical of arguments that suppose any “essential”
social or political attitudes inherent in men or women, and reflexively
friendly toward arguments that emphasize the variation in potential
attitudes within both sexes, depending on institutional and cultural
context.225 My own discussions in this Part reflect that emphasis,
treating women as agents and bearers of interests inflected by
revisable self-conceptions, rather than as vectors of essentially
“feminine” values or social modes.
I will offer one view of how women’s empowerment may weaken
the power of extremist politics. Today, the ideological appeal of such
nationalism almost always involves a reaction to women’s increased
social participation and power within the family, and a proposal to
restore “traditional” relations. This attitude holds for the Shiv Sena
and other Hindu nationalists,226 Islamists,227 and smaller-scale
reactionary movements that revive such customs as belief in, and
persecution of, witches as a way of constraining empowered

225. This emphasis partly reflects an interest throughout my work in how attitudes
toward politics, sex, race, human equality or inequality, and so forth vary from time to time
and place to place, and how institutional change can induce changes in attitudes, or at least
clear space in which such changes can occur. I think any awareness of the variety of human
experience of sex and gender makes confident generalization in an essentialist vein almost
impossible to sustain. My emphasis on contingent aspects of sex and gender also reflects a
political choice: so long as we cannot know what is fixed and what is mutable, an interest in
how non-coercive institutions can open space for free exploration of mutability—particularly in
newly egalitarian sex relations—seems to me an appropriately experimental and open-ended
attitude.
226. For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra note 110, at
142–43 (reporting that Sena members frequently identify themselves as defenders of the honor
of their nation’s women and defenders against the alleged threats to purity of ethnic mixing).
For information on the topic of Hindu nationalism as the assertion of a masculine principle, see
Brian K. Smith, Re-envisioning Hinduism and Evaluating the Hindutva Movement, 26
RELIGION 119, 120–23 (1996).
227. For discussion on the persistent appearance of women’s status and free activity as a
spur to Islamist affiliation, see generally Blind Faith, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 27,
2005, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/blind-faith/2005/08/26/1124563028951.
html (substantiating through reportage on the political and theological affiliations of the July
7, 2005 London bombers and their “jihadist obsession with purity amidst the perceived
corruption of the West”). Many commentators have remarked on the same quality in the
Islamist abhorrence of the West. See, e.g., Jonathan Raban, My Holy War, NEW YORKER, Feb.
4, 2002, at 28 (noting the gynophobia and “sense of extreme moral precariousness” in
connection with women of the founding Islamist Sayyid Qutb).
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women.228 To the extent that women have become invested in both
their new capabilities and an expanded view of their interests and
potential agency, they might well experience contemporary
nationalist movements as a direct threat. This interpretation avoids
essentialist speculation about women’s intrinsic attitudes toward
hierarchy or the effect of feminine presence on institutional culture.
Instead, this interpretation focuses on the concrete fact that most
contemporary nationalism and related extremism present a threat to
the status and participation that increase women’s power to control
resources, exercise power within the family, and influence
reproductive decisions.
This interpretation is quite plausible in Europe and may help to
explain why declining fertility has not produced a meaningful
upsurge in support for nationalist agendas there. It is not that there
has been no effort to yoke such agendas to concern about falling
population. On the contrary, France’s far-right National Front has
linked demographic alarms to attacks on abortion rights and calls for
restoring women’s traditional roles as mothers and housewives.229
This classic expression of reactionary pro-natalism, however, has
found little traction in contemporary France, where women’s
integration into political and economic life has shifted even
mainstream pro-natalist positions from a first-generation emphasis on
children as social resources to solicitude for women’s autonomy that
falls much nearer the spirit of the second-generation commitment to
autonomy. As Marie-Thérèse Letablier notes, twentieth-century
French family policy rested originally on “the idea that children were
a collective investment,” and thus “[m]others of numerous children
were rewarded for being ‘good citizens’ by giving children to the
Nation.”230
In recent decades, however, this sex-specific idea of citizenship,
in which women’s civic role is substantially identical with their
biological function, has given way to a relatively gender-equitable
concern for women’s capacity to reconcile family and work

228. See AGARWAL, supra note 188, at 271–76 (describing such episodes in Indian
villages as responses to women’s increased control of resources).
229. For discussion on the intersection of the National Front’s anti-immigration stance
and its concern with the decline in “authentically French” births, see Carolyn Sargent,
Counseling Contraception for Malian Immigrants in Paris: Global, State, and Personal Politics,
HUM. ORG., July 1, 2005, at 147.
230. Letablier, supra note 200, at 246.
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commitments.231 This reconciliation-oriented approach is compatible with recognizing that there is a collective interest in the
aggregate results of individual reproductive decisions; in this respect,
it comes to grips with contemporary demographic problems. The
reconciliation-oriented approach, however, is not compatible with
the historical impulse of pro-natalist politics: coercion in
reproductive decisions and insistence on a return to traditional sex
and gender roles. It makes room to acknowledge the social interest
in reproductive decisions but bounds that interest by principles of
autonomy and gender equity.
This analysis gives cause for guarded optimism. It suggests that
some kinds of progress are hard to reverse—specifically, that once
women are integrated into political and economic life on relatively
equitable terms, their commitment to their own substantive
freedoms will constrain the potential scope of reactionary politics.232
In this respect, at least, history may not be prologue: past episodes of
reactionary pro-natalism occurred in times and places where women
were much more economically and politically vulnerable than in
Europe today. Conversely, if political commitments to women’s
substantive freedoms are fairly stable, this means that acknowledging
demographic concerns in politics and policy may not be as
worrisome as it has sometimes seemed in a period haunted by the
ugly memory of first-generation biopolitics.
This hopeful point, however, leaves open two major reasons for
concern. One is that women’s gains in substantive freedom may
remain quite vulnerable outside Europe—both in Japan and Korea—
where fertility is well below replacement rate, and in those countries
where the demographic problem is sex disproportion. Because
women’s substantive freedoms are both the best means to address
the demographic problems themselves and, maybe, a check on the
extremist politics that otherwise tend to accompany both
231. See id. at 256–60 (outlining this shift).
232. Of course, a commitment to a mutable and contingent idea of the political behavior
of the sexes leaves open the possibility that empowered women will behave in ways that
undermine what I am calling their substantive freedom—for instance, by supporting political
programs that urge a return to hearth and kitchen or by opposing formal reproductive rights. I
can only respond that, as a rule of thumb, those who stand to lose resources or alternatives
from a political program are somewhat less likely to sign on than those who do not. I am
essentialist enough about human rationality to accept this description as capturing a
widespread tendency, albeit one that ideological, psychological, religious, or other appeals can
sometimes overcome.
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demographic crises, their fragility is worrisome. Second, even
assuming that women’s substantive freedoms are good checks against
reactionary pro-natalist politics, there is less reason to believe they
would similarly check the nativist and racist politics that might
accompany a large increase in the number of immigrants to Europe
or East Asia.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether freedom is sometimes self-undermining is an old
question, but not a tired one. Asking it is an important way of
ensuring that we do what is necessary to preserve essential freedoms.
In this spirit, I have argued that reproductive autonomy can produce
social and political consequences that might endanger liberal
freedoms. The argument is not an attack on reproductive autonomy,
but a reflection on what might be necessary to preserve it.233 In
different cultural, economic, and political settings, increasing control
over the number and the sex of children has produced subreplacement fertility rates and a growing sexual disproportion among
children and young adults. Both trends contribute to potential
political crises: a demographically inflected crisis of the welfare state
on the one hand, and a potential for growth in authoritarian parties
and institutions on the other.
The most promising response is not to cut back on reproductive
autonomy but to deepen and broaden it by seeking to increase the
233. Some readers, particularly Neil Siegel, have suggested that the appeal of this article’s
argument might be entirely independent of the reader’s beliefs about the moral status of
abortion: those who favor reproductive choice, as I do, should find in the paper an analysis of a
potential threat to it and a response that is compatible with preserving it; while those who
oppose reproductive choice should still be persuaded that sex-egalitarian social relations and
reconciliation of childbearing and career are attractive ways to mitigate serious demographic
crises. While this “overlapping consensus” view of the article is plausible and has some appeal
to me, I prefer to leave it as a speculative matter rather than insist on who should agree with
me and why. My motivations are to address potential threats to three values I hold dear:
liberalism, democracy, and a vision of sexual equality that includes formal and substantive
reproductive autonomy. Anyone who shares all or some of these values and is persuaded by my
analysis might well join in my conclusions. I suspect, however, that readers who regard
abortion as deeply wrong will find the entire discussion morally blind, and object to my
combination of (1) supposing the normative attractiveness of all aspects of reproductive
autonomy and (2) treating the results of abortion decisions in a consequentialist way rather
than concentrating on the inherent moral status of the act. The argument will thus strike them
as perverse or incomplete. To those readers I can only say that this is the character of deep and
abiding moral disagreement, and that I hope my description and argument nonetheless have
some force for them.
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bases of women’s substantive freedom: in developing countries,
education and workforce participation; in rich countries, the capacity
of women and families to reconcile work and childrearing.234
Although best paired with other policies, a focus on increasing
substantive freedom belongs at the heart of a political response to
both demographic crises. Promoting substantive freedom is not just
normatively attractive from a liberal perspective: it is also the best
practical solution to the paradoxes of autonomy. In this case, at least,
the answer to freedom’s self-undermining potential is to become
freer still.

234. This is a slightly rhetorical way of putting the matter. As I note particularly in the
text accompanying note 170, supra, it may not be possible to produce a unified metric of
“substantive autonomy.” In any event, that is not a task I have attempted here. A more
analytically precise way of putting the matter is that substantive reproductive autonomy’s
aggregate results are less likely to undermine liberal or democratic values to the extent that
reproductive autonomy is complemented by substantive freedom in literacy, workforce
participation, and the capacity to reconcile childbearing with career. Thus, enhancing these
dimensions of substantive autonomy is likely to be an effective, as well as a normatively
attractive response, to the problems of third-generation biopolitics. This autonomy-enhancing
response should be taken as a progressive alternative to the attacks on reproductive autonomy,
formal and substantive, that might accompany the illiberal dangers of third-generation
biopolitics.
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